NATO against the USSR

The history of the secret war of NATO countries against the USSR in the 50s of the last century.


In Russia, the fact that the intelligence of the United States and other NATO countries are shamefully missed the moment of the Soviet Union's creation of atomic weapons is widely known and repeated many times by our press. Less than a year before the disruption of the first Soviet atomic bomb, American journalists John Hogeron and Ellsworth Raymond published an article in the journal Luk on the title "When will Russia have an atomic bomb?" The authors' forecast was categorical, in their opinion, before 1954, the USSR could not acquire one.
   And on August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union, in deep secrecy, blew up its first nuclear bomb. The mystery surrounding this test was not at all a tribute to the paranoid fears of Stalin. The state leadership of our country had every reason to fear that after learning about the appearance of atomic weapons in the USSR, the United States will hasten a preemptive strike, without waiting for the Soviet Union to prepare a sufficient arsenal. On that day, at the Semipalatinsk Test Site of the USSR, "burned" almost all the accumulated plutonium reserves, and the new bombs had virtually nothing to do ...
   Three weeks passed and the great state secret of the USSR ceased to be so. The US Air Force meteorological flight over the Pacific Ocean was caught in a cloud of radioactive dust of incomprehensible origin. The American political leadership was shocked by the experts' assumption that a trace of the atmospheric nuclear explosion that took place in the USSR was discovered. Not trusting his own specialists, Truman ordered the transfer of dust samples for research to nuclear scientists in Canada and the United Kingdom. Only after the conclusions received from the Allies completely coincided with the conclusions of the American colleagues, the US President made an official statement, from which it followed that the Americans became aware of a nuclear explosion in the USSR. It happened on September 23, 1949, on the same day, similar statements were made by representatives of the governments of Great Britain and Canada. As the secret ceased to be a secret on September 25, 1949, the Soviet government, disseminated through the TASS message, recognized the accuracy of the statements of the American President.
   This is the storyline of this story, well known both in the USSR and in today's Russia. Much less is known about what followed.
   The US and British intelligence did not really notice the enormous efforts that the Soviet Union made to create nuclear weapons. This meant extremely low effectiveness of their reconnaissance activity in the territory of the USSR. The Americans understood that opening up the infrastructure of the nuclear industry, learning its production capacities and prospects for development, is not just an important task for them, but a vital one. But since the methods and methods of the work of ordinary intelligence showed their inefficiency in the USSR, they had to come up with something different, something that would be capable of breaking the counter-intelligence barrier of the Soviet MGB.
   The successes of American "atomic espionage" were in many respects connected with the extraordinary military intelligence officer, the colonel of the American army, the ethnic Russian Orthodox priest Boris Fyodorovich Pashkovsky. However, in America he was known for the most part under the name Pash, which he formally adopted in 1926.

Boris Pashkovsky was born on June 20, 1900 in the family of an Orthodox priest Fyodor Nikolayevich Pashkovsky (1874-1950), then secretary of the ROC mission in San Francisco. The mother of the future scout and saboteur was a girl from the Serbian community of the city and the South Slavic blood, evidently had a definite effect on his character and temperament. In 1906 Boris's father returned to Russia, and in 1910 his wife and son followed him. Boris had early discoveries for languages ​​- in addition to Russian, he had read and spoke perfectly from Serbo-Croatian in his childhood, and in the future he had perfectly studied English, German and French. As a deeply religious young man, Boris, like his grandfather and father, chose a spiritual career and in 1917 completed the accelerated course of the Kiev Theological Seminary. However, despite the ordination to the rank, he never became a priest - this will prevent the collapse of historical Russia, the Civil War and the Red Terror.
 In emigration Boris Pashkovsky married and in 1921 in Berlin became a father. The following year, the family moved to the US (in those days the US was called in Russian), to the father, who soon took monastic vows. Fyodor Nikolayevich Pashkovsky, by the way, made an outstanding career in the field of spiritual ministry and in 1934 became the metropolitan of all America and Canada of the Orthodox Church of America (so-called OCA - not to be confused with the ROCA, they are different structures!).
   Boris himself could start life again - he successfully graduated from the American College in Springfield, Massachusetts, and then the University of Southern California. And although his specialty was philosophy, Boris's present addiction to sports - you will agree, quite an unusual combination for the "egghead" intellectual of the first half of the last century. Pashkovsky enthusiastically engaged in a variety of sports, suggesting a tough, dynamic confrontation with his opponent - he excelled in boxing, playing football (classical and American), and also in rugby. In addition, he did a lot of swimming and running for medium and long distances, took prizes at competitions. In the theory of sport there is such a thing - "motor talent", by this phrase is understood the ability to make movements faster and more accurately than most ordinary healthy people. An engine that is gifted will be successful in almost any sport, except, perhaps, chess or checkers; instruct him to go swimming - and he will swim faster than anyone else, teach the fight - and he will become a great fighter. Boris Pashkovsky, apparently, was precisely from the breed of people who were motivated and to the very old age kept not only the spirits of spirit, but also the bodily fortress.

So at the very end of 1943, Boris Pashkovsky became the main "atomic spy of America." He created the "atomic special forces" - an army unit focused on the search for fissile materials, their protection and transportation using special techniques and techniques. By the end of the war the number of the "Pasha group" reached 480. At the same time, it included 24 nuclear scientists, who were supposed to advise the military on specific issues of handling nuclear materials.
 Among the successes of the "Pasha group" can be mentioned the enchanting "robbery" of the house of Julio-Curie near Paris, during which Boris Pashkovsky personally pulled from the safe the records of the famous scientist. The Americans acted under the very nose of the Germans, in fact the "Pasha group" was ahead of the advanced patrols of the American army that were moving towards Paris. It happened on August 24, 1944. The very next day Boris Pashkovsky personally met with Frederic Joliot-Curie and asked him to inform the American authorities all the information he knew about the "nuclear project" of the Third Reich. Joliot-Curie answered specific questions related to the technological details of the concept of the atomic bomb implemented by the fascists, but refused to provide any personal considerations and mathematical calculations on the issue of creating a "super-weapon".
   Joliot-Curie did not know that the smiling "Russian American" played with him in "cat and mouse." In fact, the answers of the French physicist were of little interest to Boris Pashkovsky, because at the very time when he was talking with Joliot-Curie, all the notes and theoretical workings of the latter on the topic of creating nuclear weapons were already on the plane that was flying to Washington.
   A little later, the Pasha Group managed to seize 1,200 tons of enriched uranium-238 ore, which were put into long-term storage facilities. In the shortest time, Pashkovsky reconstructed the work of a metal packaging factory located nearby, destroyed by allied aviation attacks, which made it necessary to produce a number of barrels and uranium raw materials to be exported to the United States. Now few people remember that the first five American nuclear bombs were made from raw materials delivered from Europe (from there, not only uranium, but also plutonium). Without Boris Pasha, there would be neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki.
 Until mid-1947 Pashkovsky remained in Japan, and then returned to Europe. Boris Fedorovich was appointed to the post of officer of communication between military intelligence and the newly created Central Intelligence Agency. The American intelligence community in Europe at that time had a lot of problems, the most serious of which were a huge number of people displaced to the West who did not want to return to the territory under the control of the USSR, and a colossal growth of pro-Soviet sentiments in the largest countries, US allies. Pashkovsky had to decide both.
 But in 1951 Boris Fedorovich Pashkovsky received a new, perhaps most responsible in his life appointment. He was invited to lead the work on the exploration of nuclear facilities of the USSR, about which at that time the Americans had extremely fragmentary information. The conditions of conducting intelligence reconnaissance in the Soviet Union were extremely difficult at that time. In 1949, the Ministry of State Security, headed by Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, adopted an unprecedented in the history of civilized intelligence services to counter the activities of foreign intelligence services on the territory of the country. This document gave the staff of the MGB the widest powers to carry out operational work, not only against citizens of the USSR, but also foreign diplomats. The following year, as part of the MGB, Bureau No. 2 was created, designed to take on the strength of opposition to foreign intelligence agents, or persons taken for such. Employees of the Bureau in the guise of hooligans made attacks on foreigners, beat and robbed them, stole luggage of foreigners at the crossing, invaded hotel rooms like thieves. A female employee, acting in the guise of prostitutes, feigned sleeping pills and robbed foreign clients. Yes, literally, so rudely, straightforwardly, without unnecessary tricks ... The task before the employees of Bureau No. 2 was formulated by the leadership in an extremely artless way - to create for the "spies" an intolerable situation, so that they simply were afraid to stick their noses out anywhere except the embassy, ​​the Red Square and the Bolshoi Theater.
   A vivid example of the extremely unceremonious style of the work of Soviet state security of those years can be the story of the "exposure" of three American scouts in Volgograd in the summer of 1955. Three officers of the US military attache in the ranks of the colonel, major and captain left for the city on the Volga on an official trip, in the manner requested six months earlier in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Having received permission, the Americans arrived in Volgograd, strolled along the streets and embankments, carrying a scanner of radio frequencies of centimeter range. To understand the purpose of the promenade of overseas visitors was not a big deal - the Americans tried to find out workers often.

A vivid example of the extremely unceremonious style of the work of Soviet state security of those years can be the story of the "exposure" of three American scouts in Volgograd in the summer of 1955. Three officers of the US military attache in the ranks of the colonel, major and captain left for the city on the Volga on an official trip, in the manner requested six months earlier in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Having received permission, the Americans arrived in Volgograd, strolled along the streets and embankments, carrying a scanner of radio frequencies of centimeter range. It was not difficult to understand the purpose of the overseas guests' promenade - the Americans tried to find out the working frequencies of the Soviet radars, which were included for testing at the factory. To do this, it was not necessary to invade the territory of the plant, it was enough to walk along the perimeter along the fence, the scanner caught the signals of the launched transmitters and showed the exact frequency of tuning. It was she who was interested in American guests.
   Volgograd counterespioners made a secret search in the hotel room of the Americans, which in itself turned into a real production show, as overseas visitors tried to keep the room unattended. Nevertheless, the KGB officers managed to get rid of their presence, having blocked in the elevator and restaurant toilet. Operatives were convinced of the availability of special equipment for Americans and ... became at an impasse, not knowing what to do. Eventually, leading cadres came from Moscow, who staged a real "mask show." The Americans were publicly "exposed" as spies, with wringing their hands and badly hammered blows in the groin, conducted a new search in the room (this time public, with the shaking out of condoms from suitcases), presented to the witnesses "espionage equipment" and told Soviet journalists about it. The absurdity of the situation was that American servicemen did not violate Soviet laws or international law: they were officially in the USSR on the rights of representatives of the US Armed Forces, they properly received permission for the trip, and their actions during this trip did not go beyond the permissible limits . The fact that Soviet military production was not adequately protected from technical intelligence was a problem with the poor organization of the technological process and incompetent counterintelligence, but these shortcomings did not give the KGB any reason to act so rudely and clumsily against Americans. Such arbitrariness with respect to representatives of the military attaché can not be imagined, say, in the 1970s. of the last century, or say in our time - now the state security officers are working much thinner and more correctly - but for the 50's. similar stories were the norm. The special services of the opposing blocs did not stand on ceremony with each other.
 Boris Pashkovsky, who analyzed the possibilities of the US intelligence community in the USSR, understood that it is useless to rely on traditional intelligence intelligence. A powerful MGB simply would not allow the Americans to turn around. Boris Fyodorovich proposed to entrust the exploration of the alleged objects of the atomic industry of the USSR to groups of specially selected and trained people who were illegally sent to the country. In other words, Pashkovsky suggested to the leadership of the intelligence community to return to the idea of ​​"nuclear special forces" that proved itself during the Second World War, of course, adjusted for the specifics of the current moment, because the USSR and the US were not at war. Well, and of course, taking into account the latest achievements of science and technology.
   The tactics of the scouts assumed their illegal transfer to the territory of the USSR and subsequent actions there alone, in pairs and quads. The scouts were to receive photographs of the object, samples of soil and water from nearby reservoirs. Subsequently, the illegal exit of scouts from the country along with the samples they extracted was assumed. Research organizations in the United States or other countries of NATO had to study the samples delivered by the special agents and draw an unambiguous conclusion about both the quality characteristics of the products produced at the secret facility and its quantity. In 1951, nuclear physicists and radiologists already guaranteed that with 100% probability they would be able to recognize any type of production of fissile materials for existing types of nuclear weapons at that time. To be clear about what is at stake, we give an example. In the production of weapons-grade uranium-235 (U-235), almost three hundred isotopes of 34 chemical elements are synthesized, which inevitably enter the environment in the immediate vicinity of the place of production. Water and soil around it received a unique set of rare isotopes that indicated the type of production existing in this place as unambiguously as fingerprints on the person who left them. With the production and extraction of plutonium, the set of isotopes must have been completely different and to confuse it with uranium production was completely impossible. Laboratory analysis of soil samples. Laboratory analysis of soil and water samples could easily show the connection of a particular bouquet of "isotope tails" with a certain type of production.

It is clear that the scouts could not be sent at random - in the then USSR there was an atmosphere of total secrecy, and therefore even the most innocent or backward industries treasuredly guarded the non-existent state secrets. Thus. a large role was assigned to the preliminary exploration of the proposed facilities of the nuclear industry by technical means. These were reconnaissance planes equipped with photographic equipment operating in the visible and infrared ranges (to be quite accurate, the IR cameras were added after 1951, but in the context of our sketch this is completely insignificant). The basic reconnaissance aircraft, to which the Americans bet in the late 40's - early 50's. was the RB-50, which was a modification of the B-29 strategic bomber. It was a very strong and reliable aircraft, which had only one drawback, which, however, destroyed all its merits - slowdown. From time to time, Soviet air defense fighters managed to intercept and destroy these violators (the first confirmed such case is dated April 8, 1950, when the B-29 was shot down over the Baltic Sea after it reached the airspace of the USSR for 21 km).



Because of this, already in the early 50's. American military intelligence acquired another aircraft - a modification of the B-47 jet-bomber "Stratojet", which received the designation RB-47. It was a real pirate, accelerating to 980 km / h and climbing to a height of more than 10 km (it is noteworthy that even with the definition of the ceiling of the flight of "stratogets" there is a certain ambiguity, different sources call different numbers - 10,100 m and 10,500 m, and 11,900 m, and even 13,500 m for the lightest modification under the B-47 A. It is clear only that this aircraft could perform a long flight with a speed of more than 950 km / h at altitudes exceeding 10 km - a phenomenal result against the background of its piston brothers!). At this altitude, the radius of its visibility horizon (optical and radar) was approaching 250 km! Unique cameras with a focal length of 2.5 m, developed by the Americans in 1953, made it possible to obtain detailed photographs from a distance of 100 km or more. When such a camera was at the disposal of the British, then from their reconnaissance aircraft "Canberra" they took a photograph of St. Paul's Cathedral in London. The plane itself was at this time above the English Channel in the Dover area. In the photo, a colonnade under the dome was clearly visible (if a separate column is visible in the picture, it means that the missile will be visible at the starting position). British intelligence officers were shocked by the quality of American optics.
   Americans worked hard to increase the range of their main bomber and scout. For the latter, range was particularly important. Stratoget was the first of the serial aircraft to receive a refueling system in the air. The modification of the "stratoget" with the B-47E index launched in the beginning of 1953 took almost 70,000 liters of fuel, which was almost 40% higher than the fuel of the previous types. The radius of flight of these aircraft reached 4630 km - this meant that the "stratogether", taking off from the airbase in Greenland, could reach the vicinity of Sverdlovsk via the North Pole and return without refueling. And the plane, departed from Turkey, in the same way, without refueling, could fly to Baikal and back. With the refueling in the air, the range became almost unlimited, which the Americans confirmed and, with the aim of advertising their aircraft, the flight of the globe.
   On the basis of the "E" modification, the Americans made a large number of "stratogets", "confined" to the solution of highly specialized tasks, not related to bombing attacks on the enemy. For example, 36 aircraft were converted into repeaters in the event of the failure of military communications systems during the war; 2 aircraft were used as experimental ones for approbation of systems of radio-electronic wrestling (and were written off only in the late 70s of the last century, having survived all other "stratogets" in the ranks); 3 reconnaissance aircraft with ERB-47H index were specially created to intercept telemetric information from the board of Soviet ballistic missiles launched from Tyratam; 35 aircraft were equipped with radio reconnaissance techniques and another 255 - photo reconnaissance. The latter had 11 cameras with different optical characteristics and took on board 10 illuminating aerial bombs. High-altitude photography at night with illuminated objects with aerial bombs was considered one of the main tactical methods of using reconnaissance "stratogets" until the early 1960s. the last century.


B-47 jet-bomber "Stratojet"


Stratoget was practically invulnerable to the Soviet MiG-15 and -17, which at that time formed the basis of the fleet of Soviet fighter aircraft. In order not to be downed by a Soviet interceptor, the "forty-seventh" was required only not to approach the airbase of air defense fighters' bases closer than 150 km. Having such a head start, the "American" could feel safe, because the Soviet plane spent almost all the fuel on the dog, and after the attack could not return to the airfield. In addition, the Stratogets were quite maneuverable and the experienced pilot could quite successfully resist the attempts to attack himself only due to the high flight characteristics of the aircraft.

Stratoget was practically invulnerable to the Soviet MiG-15 and -17, which at that time formed the basis of the fleet of Soviet fighter aircraft. In order not to be downed by a Soviet interceptor, the "forty-seventh" was required only not to approach the airbase of air defense fighters' bases closer than 150 km. Having such a head start, the "American" could feel safe, because the Soviet plane spent almost all the fuel on the dog, and after the attack could not return to the airfield. In addition, the Stratogets were quite maneuverable and the experienced pilot could quite successfully resist the attempts to attack himself only due to the high flight characteristics of the aircraft.
For example, on October 15, 1952, two "stratogets" invaded the airspace of the Soviet Union in the vicinity of Wrangel Island. One of the aircraft flew along the northern coast of Chukotka, obviously diverting the attention of local air defense forces, and the second went deep into the continental part of the country and crossed the Chukchi Peninsula. Over the Bay of Providence, already in the Bering Sea, he turned and walked towards Alaska. The airplanes of MiG-15 lifted into the air could not intercept the violator. The plane overcame more than 1300 km over the territory of the USSR, and its commander received the Order "For flying merits".
   In August 1953, the British reconnaissance plane Canberra with the newest American camera on board carried out reconnaissance of the missile test range at Kapustin Yar. The flight was carried out at altitudes of 14 500 m and higher along the route Prague-Kiev-Kharkov-Volga-Caspian Sea-Iran. During this flight, the British pilots witnessed how the MiG-15 fighters, which had risen from different airfields to intercept them, entered into battle with each other - the airplanes apparently belonged to different military units and poor coordination of air defense services led to the fact that the pilots were not are warned about joint actions. Canberra itself could not have got hold of the Soviet interceptors: the plane successfully completed the mission and subsequently scouts of this type were used by the United Kingdom more than once to invade the skies of the Soviet Union.

But on September 10, 1957, one of the most mysterious operations of American intelligence in the skies of the USSR took place. A certain high-altitude airplane flew from Iran over the Caspian Sea with a subsequent access to the Stalingrad-Armavir-Grozny-Tbilisi-Iran route, flying about 3050 km in total over the territory of the USSR. The plane carried out reconnaissance of the missile test range in Kapustin Yar and an aviation test site in Vladimirovka. In 100 km from Vladimirovka from an intruder plane, a certain object separated itself, which quickly left the Soviet radar field, having developed a speed of about 1800 km / h. It looked like an intruder-plane simulated an attack of a ground object with a cruise missile. Despite all the efforts of the Armed Forces of the USSR to get its fragments at their disposal and a large-scale search operation initiated for this purpose, the fragments of the mysterious high-speed facility were never found. Until now, the type of intruder is unknown, since the launching height (19 km) clearly exceeded the Stratoget's ceiling, and the U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft did not have arms suspension nodes (however, it is impossible to completely exclude the errors of ground-based radar operators whose professionalism For example, during the events of May 1, 1961, when Francis Powers was shot down on the U-2, the 2nd Division of the 57th SAM continued to fire at the target after its defeat, believing that it continues normal flight 9 separate radio engineering the 4th battalion gave out to the CP of the 4th Air Defense Army a message about the "target at the altitude of 19 km" until the moment when the collapsing U-2 dropped to a height of 5.5 km and Powers had long since left his cabin, that is, stopped any It is possible that with the determination of the launch altitude on September 10, 1957 in the area of ​​Vladimirovka, we are dealing with a similar error of our specialists).

Boris Fyodorovich Pashkovsky believed that if the aerial reconnaissance would be the eyes that secret objects would see, then the soldiers of his special forces would be those hands that could touch them. No aircraft, no one in the 40's and 50's. In the past century, it was not possible to remotely determine by what kind of fissile material the nuclear reactor was engaged. To do this, we needed samples of water and soil, obtained in the immediate vicinity of it.
       U-2 aircraft were actively used to penetrate into the most remote regions of the USSR. It is a mistake to think that Powers' flight to the Urals in May 1960 was the first of such incursions. On February 5, 1960, for example, the reconnaissance plane U-2 "descended" to Arzamas-16 and photographed the research center and the plant producing nuclear charges located there. In the photo on the left you can see part of the factory buildings, and in the photo to the right - a separate workshop for the final assembly of nuclear munitions. Up to the Norwegian border in the north - about 1800 km, to the Turkish south - the same.

Beginning in 1952, US military intelligence began to regularly send to the territory of the USSR both single-person reconnaissance and reconnaissance groups with the sole task of collecting soil and water samples from areas of the proposed location of nuclear facilities. After 1956, when the Libby technology was already worked out, the collection of biological samples was added to them. I must say that by this time the Americans, as well as the British, their closest NATO allies, had had a certain experience in conducting a sabotage war against the USSR. Since the end of World War II, the United States and Britain have provided significant military and technical assistance to the Baltic and Western Ukrainian separatists. On the same field, the intelligence service of the Vatican was tied up, and since 1955 Italian special services began to actively work with the nationalists.
   It is well known that the British paratroopers from the SAS (Special Air Service) were engaged in sabotage training of the OUN guerrillas directly at the locations of their detachments. The story of the capture of the chief of the OUN security service, Myron Matviyeyko, is well known, we will not retell it here, as it is quite far from the topic of the essay. We only note that Matviyeiko, who was dropped from the side of an English transport aircraft in June 1951 (or delivered by a glider - there is no complete clarity), flew to the USSR not alone - in addition to bodyguards, he was accompanied by a British paratrooper, a mine-training instructor. And when three OUN detachments were destroyed near Lviv, which followed soon after his arrest, five Englishmen were killed, as well as instructors from SAS. According to incomplete Soviet data, which became public in the 90s, the MGB-KGB captured at least 33 OUN saboteurs sent from abroad; Miron Matvieiko himself spoke about 200 volunteers who were sent to study in the intelligence schools of Great Britain and the USA in the second half of the 1940s. There is no doubt that the preparation of OUN's underground and saboteurs was carried out by foreign intelligence services in large numbers and on a regular basis.
   Very interesting is the story of the Baltic saboteurs, sent usually from the territory of Great Britain or Sweden. It is believed that these "forest brothers" shot the chairmen of the kolkhozes and deputies of the district soviets, engaged in small banditry and terrorized the local population, but this is a very simplified picture of their present subversive activities. Sometimes experienced saboteurs arranged real battles with units of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and parts of the Armed Forces. In 1956, a sabotage group, consisting of four Estonian nationalists (the oldest - Axel Poray), landed from a speedboat, entered into battle with Soviet border guards, killing several of them (including the commander of the outpost of the station, Lieutenant Mikhail Mikhailovich Kozlov) , and left the persecution.

On the night of August 17 to August 18, 1952, Soviet border guards in the northern part of. Sakhalin, in a completely uninhabited area, an unknown man was detained, got out of the water in a rubberized suit, mask and fins. The unknown was later identified as Yevgeny Golubev, born in 1923. The purpose of his appearance on the territory of the USSR was the execution of a special task in the interests of the US Department of Defense intelligence. Golubev was landed from a speedboat at a distance of about 700 meters from the shore, with himself a scout had two waterproof bags. There were 2 radio stations for work at different frequencies, a rich set of chemical preparations-anesthetics-derived morphine, sleeping pills, poisons of both instantaneous and delayed action, 25,000 rubles in small banknotes, 100,000 rubles in large-value bonds, and also 25 gold "chervonets" of the royal coinage. By itself, the scout was not bad armed: 2 submachine guns, 3 combat knives, one of which had a bladed blade. Before Golubev was tasked to penetrate into the neighborhood of Chelyabinsk-40, to perform reconnaissance of the object, to obtain documents of servicemen guarding the closed city, to collect and preserve water and soil samples outside the protected perimeter, after which to leave for the specified region of Armenia and independently cross the Soviet-Turkish border in the corridor known to him. The method and time of the transition were predetermined in advance. Golubev had to act completely autonomously, not coming into contact with representatives of American intelligence in the territory of the USSR.
   Particularly noteworthy is the fact that Golubev, when nominated to the object of exploration, had to overcome almost 5,000 km. Tickets and boarding passes for various types of transport, which he would have to get on the way, had to back up his "legend" in case of verification.

Here is an example of a group trip. May 2, 1952 in the territory of the Volyn region (Ukraine) from the reconnaissance aircraft of the US armed forces RB-50, launched from about. Malta, three reconnaissance aircraft were dropped-Kurochkin AP (born in 1927), I. Voloshanovsky (born 1927), and LV Koshelev (born 1929). The object, the exploration of which was to be carried out, was the Lisichansk nitrogen fertilizer plant, which, according to the opinion of the US military intelligence, disguised the production of heavy water (D2O), an important raw material for nuclear reactors. In addition, the neglected agents were tasked with obtaining authentic documents from law enforcement officers, primarily the MGB. All three were armed with automatic weapons and grenades. The group had to split up, Kurochkin had to perform his task separately from Voloshanovsky and Koshelev. The latter were professional criminals who lived since 1947 on false documents and in 1949 fled to Iran. At the time of his escape from the country at the age of 20, Koshelev had already had two camp "huts", numerous detentions and arrests. Kurochkin himself deserted from the ranks of the Soviet Army during his service in Austria. The exit of the abandoned agents from the country was planned through the Iran-Azerbaijan border.
   All three attended a special training course at the US Armed Forces Intelligence School in Germany and had material resources approximately in the same volume as the Golubev mentioned above. From the radio game with their American curators, they evaded, apparently telling them an implicit signal about the work under control, as a result of which the American radio center ceased to maintain contact with the unmasked agents. For this hidden sabotage and unwillingness to repent of the crimes committed, all three were sentenced to capital punishment and shot.
   In the spring and summer of 1955, KGB authorities detained four pairs of American intelligence officers (8 people), abandoned in the USSR by planes that started in Greek Thessaloniki. All these people underwent intensified 9-month training in the intelligence department of the US Department of Defense in the territory of Germany. Some of them were trained in training centers in the US, for example, on the basis of airborne forces in Fort Bragg. One of the abandoned - Peter Kudrin - was involved in a radio game with US intelligence, which lasted more than a year and a half. The object of Kudrin's reconnaissance was to become a production complex in the Moscow region of Elektrostal, where, according to the Americans, since 1947 the first in the USSR factory for the production of uranium-235 metal was functioning. Kudrin was supposed to portray himself as a criminal who had freed himself from the penal colony, who was driving around the Moscow region for the purpose of finding a job and, as it were, accidentally ends up in Elethrostal. There he was to collect in the shortest possible time the necessary samples and go to the south for the illegal crossing of the Turkish border. In order to draw US military intelligence into a radio game, KGB operatives came up with a "new introductory" for the Kudrin mission, designed to confuse the Yankees. Kudrin told the intelligence center that he managed, through a friend he accidentally met, to get a job at a secret plant that was producing allegedly initiating components of nuclear warheads. This secret facility, they say, is disguised as a thermometer factory in the Moscow region of Klin. In fact, there, of course, such a production never existed. The Americans were so intrigued by the story invented by Soviet counter-espionage that they reoriented Kudrin to a "long settling" in Klin. The fact that the Americans believed for more than a year and a half the stories of an agent recounted by the KGB, and could not verify his reports, perfectly illustrates the extreme limitations of their agency positions in the USSR of those years. Pashkovsky did not have agents in high positions in the Minsredmash or the Ministry of Defense, otherwise he would have figured out the fiction about the "thermometer plant" in Klin in a month.

Another story is very unusual with the landing of two American submarine scouts who happened in Kamchatka in August 1958. The spies were to pass about 120 km to the area of ​​the Kura missile test site, where the main parts of intercontinental R-7 missiles launched from Baikonur fell. Most likely, Americans were interested in the thermal insulation of Soviet combat units, because at that time the Yankees did not have operating intercontinental missiles and the return of cargo from Earth to Earth was a great technical problem for them. Now it is only possible to judge the purpose of the appearance of American scouts in Kamchatka, since they died for some unknown reasons about 70 km from the landing site. Most likely, during a halt, a bear attacked them; in August, bears are very active and are particularly aggressive in finding food, as they fatten fat before hibernation. After the death of scouts, their bodies were significantly destroyed by forest animals. The dead were found by Soviet border guards, who spent a week searching for mysterious divers. Although the identity of the scouts was not established, nevertheless their weapons and equipment fell into the hands of the Soviet state security.
   In June 1960, when an attempt was made to cross the Soviet-Iranian border, an agent of US military intelligence, Viktor Slavnov, illegally abandoned in the USSR ten months earlier, was detained. Slavnov fulfilled the task assigned to him-he collected the necessary number of samples in the vicinity of the closed city of Tomsk-7 (the Americans called the area "Siberian Station" until the 90's). With him, the scout had a gun of noiseless shooting, a cold steel, a first-aid kit with a wide range of drugs (including poisons) and a set of seals and stamps, allowing for very few minutes to produce very believable documents. In view of Slavnov's refusal to cooperate with the KGB, he was tried and sentenced to capital punishment.
   It should be noted that the problem of abandoning foreign paratroopers could not but worry the country's top leadership and state security bodies. Order No. 00177 of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs dated April 29, 1953, on the basis of Bureau No. 2 of the USSR MGB (which was mentioned in this essay), was organized by the Special Operations Group (SOG) to search for enemy paratroopers. Colonel MS Prudnikov was appointed chief of the SOG.

In the interests of US military intelligence, the famous designer Robert Fulton (Robert Fulton) in 1957-58. has developed and tested a unique system of lifting a person on the surface of the earth to the side of a flying airplane. The device is called "heavenly hook" and despite the apparent fantasy, it was surprisingly successful and safe to operate. At first, a metal container weighing 150 kg was dropped from the flying plane to the scout who was waiting for the evacuation. He wore a warm overall and a special "harness", which the scout was to put on, a balloon with helium, a mini balloon inflated with this helium, and a 150 m nylon cord. One end of the cord was attached to a mini-balloon, and the other to the harness.
   Thus. the evacuee was tightly connected to a mini-balloon, the only task of which was to keep the nylon rope taut. A mini-balloon could not tear a man off the ground, although in a strong wind he sometimes dragged his body along a smooth ice or snowy surface. The airplane evacuator had a special "mustache-fork" in the bow, which at a speed of about 220 km / h was cut by a stretched nylon cord. The mini-balloon was cut off, and the cord was automatically wound with a winch that raised the person on the aircraft.
     The first airplane, equipped with a system of picking up a man from the ground, was the C-130 Hercules transport-landing. Military intelligence for their purposes ordered at least 7 aircraft equipped with the "heavenly hook" system, they were all modernized basic patrol airplanes P2V-7 "Neptune". The main advantage of the latter was the ability to barrage at low speeds at extremely low altitudes (30-50 m). These aircraft were widely used for the evacuation of reconnaissance groups from the territory of the USSR and China.



The "sky hook" system was successfully tested in August 1958. The first person brought on board the aircraft in "conditions close to combat" was the sergeant of the US Marine Corps, Livi Woods. It happened on the 12th of August. In the following weeks, the "sky hook" was tested in various conditions of use: on the water, in the mountains, in the forest area. The reviews were most positive.



This concludes a long digression into the history of secret reconnaissance operations of the United States and NATO countries on the territory of the USSR and we summarize what has been said:
   - In the 50's. In the last century, a massive illegal transfer of agents trained in the West to carry out secret operations of various kinds was carried out in the USSR, as subversive and subversive (separatist movements in Ukraine and the Baltic countries) and narrowly reconnaissance. We are talking about hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals who have received special training in training centers in Europe and the United States;
   - There were at least 6 US Defense Intelligence Schools in Western Europe that trained agents for deep exploration of strategic facilities in the USSR, primarily those related to the nuclear cycle ("transit agents"). The location of the six schools mentioned above is known, some of their graduates were detained on the territory of the USSR after an illegal transfer. The total number of agents trained by these schools is currently unknown, but an estimate of 500-600 people. in the period 1951-1960. seems to be quite reliable (from the calculation of training in 1 school 10 people throughout the year, although in fact the training cycle was shorter and the graduates were clearly more);
   - Soviet nuclear plants in the Urals and Western Siberia were in the focus of attention of the US military intelligence, as eloquently evidenced by information on these sites, repeatedly voiced at a hearing in the United States Atomic Energy Committee of the Congress of the United States throughout the 50's;
   - It can be said with a high degree of certainty that in those years the American intelligence community did not have sources of information in the highest state and political leadership of the USSR or among high-level technical experts on access to state secrets (information). The information received by the Americans was in many ways jerky, incomplete, fragmentary. The "transit" agents and the samples they produced were the main source of information on the objects of the atomic industry of the Soviet Union. To monitor the situation on the sites of the Soviet atomic complex and to reveal the dynamics of their productivity, US intelligence had to carry out periodic collection of biological and mineral samples from their immediate vicinity, for which the sending of "transit" agents was put on stream, ie, had a regular character;
   - The "transit" scouts were sent from different directions and in different ways for many thousands of kilometers from the object of interest. The assignments assigned by the agents assumed their independent nomination to the reconnaissance area, for which the "transit" had the necessary funds and reliable documents (travel regulations, certificates of release from places of detention, certificates of law enforcement officers, etc.). Depending on the specific situation, they could impersonate a variety of people from liberated criminals and geologists, to security officers and courier officers accompanying secret mail.
 It is clear that the accidental meeting of the group of Igor Dyatlov with the abandoned American intelligence officers did not threaten the latter. In fact, the scouts had types that fully corresponded to the time and place, they were perfectly legendary and, during a simple conversation, it was absolutely impossible to detect inconsistencies in their stories. What danger was there for them to meet with a group of tourists? Yes, no, zero ... This, in general, is obvious.
   However, all evidence disappears, as soon as we remember about radioactive clothing. In the usual campaign it should not have been. Once again we recall that at that time control over the turnover of fissile materials was related to the competence of the KGB, an attempt to keep clothes with radioactive dust could be regarded as an attempt to deceive the state security organs.
   Is it possible to assume that clothes with radioactive dust were associated with Georgi Krivonischenko and appeared because of the latter's work in the "atomic city"? In principle, the assumption is logical, lying, so to speak, on the surface. There are only a few "buts" that need to be mentioned in this regard.
   First, after the so-called. "Kyshtym explosion," which resulted in the release of a significant amount of radioactive waste into the atmosphere in Chelyabinsk-40 in the vicinity of Chelyabinsk in September 1957, there was a significant (albeit very uneven) infection of the city itself, its streets and buildings. At the end of September and in October 1957, significant decontamination work was carried out in Chelyabinsk-40, comparable in scale to those that occurred almost 40 years later in the areas adjacent to Chernobyl. Dosimetric control posts conducted total measurements of the radioactive background throughout the city and the surrounding area. In particular, the living quarters were subjected to inspection. In those days and months, this city became, probably, the cleanest city of the Soviet Union - before the entrances of residential houses.

First, after the so-called. "Kyshtym explosion," which resulted in the release of a significant amount of radioactive waste into the atmosphere in Chelyabinsk-40 in the vicinity of Chelyabinsk in September 1957, there was a significant (albeit very uneven) infection of the city itself, its streets and buildings. At the end of September and in October 1957, significant decontamination work was carried out in Chelyabinsk-40, comparable in scale to those that occurred almost 40 years later in the areas adjacent to Chernobyl. Dosimetric control posts conducted total measurements of the radioactive background throughout the city and the surrounding area. In particular, the living quarters were subjected to inspection. In those days and months, this city was probably the cleanest city of the Soviet Union - in front of the entrances of apartment houses, special washes for shoes were installed in running water so that people entering the streets could wash off street dust. By the way, it almost did not exist - the city was literally "licked" by servicemen, the dust was washed several times in the autumn from roofs, facades and cornices of all buildings. What is especially important for our narrative is that personal items, clothes and shoes of the inhabitants of the city were subjected to dosimetric control. Yes, literally, mobile posts bypassed apartments, dormitories, shops, schools, warehouses and checked all the items in a row. No one at that time could prohibit or restrict the activities of dosimetrists. "Dirty" items were seized, duly activated and their owner could receive material compensation for seized (lost) property. Thus. Georgy Krivonischenko had no reason to treasure a radioactive sweater or trousers - having handed them "in accordance with the act" to the dosimetry control service, he not only guaranteed his health, but also received a monetary compensation for it.
   Secondly, it is completely incomprehensible that Georgy Krivonischenko could have benefited from an attempt to hide the "dirty" clothes in case of her success. In the name of what was he supposed to do all this? Obvious with the household, or otherwise, the everyday, there is simply no answer. No matter how good a sweater or pants, they were not worth the risk of earning Kaposi's leukemia or sarcoma, which means that the way to these things could be one - in the trash. And it's by no means a march to Oorten, where these things, perhaps, George would have to carry for a couple of weeks, or even more. Do not lose sight of another, very delicate, but understandable to any man aspect - George Krivonischenko in 1959 was only the twenty-fourth year (he was born on February 7, 1935), and this is the time of man's power! The fact that radioactivity oppresses the sexual function, then already knew perfectly well, and no reasonable man would put on himself even the most beautiful, but "dirty" sweater without a lead apron. Health at all times was more valuable than even the most beautiful rag.
   Thirdly, the stored things with radioactive dust turned their possessor into a potential traitor to the Motherland. If ever it became known about the storage of such clothes, it would mean the most serious consequences for its owner. For George Krivonischenko, this would entail both a loss of confidence in the workplace, and the loss of the work itself, and the list of possible troubles was far from exhausted. I want to ask: does he want it?
   What is the conclusion from everything written above? It is extremely simple: in the usual situation, in the usual tourist trip of radioactive items, the members of the group Igor Dyatlov should not have been in any situation.