What and how happened on the slope of Holat-Sahyl after 16 hours on February 1, 1959.

What and how happened on the slope of Holat-Sahyl after 16 hours on February 1, 1959.
Now, perhaps, it's time to dwell on why on the slope of Holat-Syahyl happened what happened? What factors caused the tragedy, was there a chance to avoid it?


To understand the internal logic of events, it is necessary to determine the model of the alleged actions planned within the framework of the "controlled delivery" operation. The general scheme of such an operation was set out above. Krivonischenko carried clothes contaminated with isotope dust in his backpack with the purpose of transferring agents of foreign intelligence to the meeting, and Zolotaryov and Kolevatov had to play the role of providing, ensuring against various kinds of surprises, distracting attention and smoothing out the "roughnesses" ", Possible in the process of communication. For the meeting, most likely, some "window of permissible expectation" was appointed, ie, a time frame within which the shift of the meeting moment was allowed (delay of one of the groups). However, it was extremely undesirable for our tourists to be late, and the Djatlov group should have come to the place of the planned rendezvous at a strictly specified time - the deviation threatened, if not the breakdown of the meeting, or the excitement of the unwarranted side of unnecessary suspicions. Among other things, Zolotarev was given a very important role - photographing persons who appeared to receive the goods. For this he had, besides a conventional camera, found later in the tent, the second with a special film.
   Since "experienced tourists - researchers of the tragedy of the Diatlov group", as the practice of communicating with those on the Internet showed, do not have a clue about elementary things and phenomena (like finishing a man with a knee blow or the duration of the R-7 rocket engine), mention of a special film requires some explanation.

KGB officers who sent Zolotaryov and Krivonishenko to the task, understood perfectly well that the conditions for taking photographs might not be very favorable. Therefore, Zolotarev most likely should have received a special film under the conventional name "shield" (this term denoted a whole family of special films developed by the KGB in the second half of the 50s of the last century, all of which were intended for use under special conditions and their main feature was the presence of two photosensitive layers - one on top of the other - perceiving light waves of different parts of the spectrum.Thanks to this, each frame of such a film could carry two different images made at the same time The conditions of different illumination, and in addition, one of the layers could be "shone" without destroying the image on the second layer). The KGB made extensive use of shield films in various special operations both inside and outside the country, as some of its variants allowed to take photographs both in low-light conditions, and in parts of the spectrum, or in the border zone of human visibility, or lying outside such . Visually the film "shield" was no different from the usual and taking a coil with it in his hands, it was impossible to guess about its special properties. In the KGB, these films were considered highly protected and unique, but as practice showed, their properties were clearly overestimated. The Swedish counterintelligence, which unmasked in June 1960 a Soviet intelligence officer, Colonel General Staff Stig Wennerström, was able to uncover the secret of the "shield" and extract footage from the "hidden" layer, which contained top secret materials prepared for handing over to the illegal liaison. This was not the only reason that caused the failure of the experienced Soviet intelligence officer Wennerström, but the most, perhaps, weighty argument in favor of his guilt. After many years, Wennerström recalled that the "specially protected" film was "the thickest nail" that the Swedish counterintelligence had stabbed him in the coffin. It should be specially pointed out that when using films of this type the camera itself did not play a special role (that is, a special camera was not required). Nevertheless, the camera could also be special - with a silent shutter release, in the second half of the 50's. such photographic equipment was already available to Soviet counterintelligence.
   The movement of the Igor Dyatlov group in the context of the version of the "controlled delivery" until January 31 does not cause much interest - the campaign was held in regular mode with the holding of the necessary schedule. We assume that at the railway station in Serov Georgy Krivonischenko got in touch by telephone with the curator of the operation and reported on the situation developing within the group. The next contact with the curator, quite possibly, took place when the group was located in Vizhae; there, as in Serov, there was some absurd situation (associated with the transfer of the group from the club to the hotel), which gives reason to suspect it. From the moment the group left the populated areas, an "autonomy" began, in which the algorithm for the actions of the entire group was determined by instructions received by Zolotarev in Sverdlovsk, although this, of course, nobody knew except Zolotaryov himself and his secret work associates - Kolevatov and Krivonischenko.

So, on January 31 the group was in a mountainous area - if before that the movement occurred first upstream of the Lozva and Auspii rivers in conditions of a uniformly rising relief, now the group was surrounded by real mountains. Although not very steep and not the highest, but significantly distorted the horizon (an attentive reader remembers that part of this essay, where the question of the onset of twilight in a mountainous area) was considered. Apparently, January 31 turned out to be a day of good humor and a "light" ski track for the members of the group, because despite general fatigue Igor Dyatlov decided to move the group at the very end of the transition by a quick jerk through the pass, which was subsequently named after him, to the Lozva Valley to spend the night there. In other words, the group had to pass through the Holat-Sahyl mountain and on February 1 this mountain actually had to remain behind the back of tourists. They would move forward towards Oorten, moving away from the pass and from the mountain.
   This, however, was not included in the plans of Zolotarev and his subordinates, for the "controlled delivery" was planned for February 1, 1959 on the slope of the Holat-Sahyl (or its summit - we can not know about the exact landmarks, and this is unprincipled) . In other words, the Djatlov group jumped to the finish line ahead of schedule. And this was destroying the whole combination: Krivonischenko did not have time to put on his radioactive clothes. Zolotarev - did not prepare a camera with a special film, hidden deep in the backpack ... And then one of the simple combinations, pre-designed and prepared during the development of the operation, was followed. Dyatlov's group was held back a bit, just enough to prevent her from moving to the Lozva Valley ahead of time and forcing her to go on a repeated assault on the slope of Holat-Sahyl the next day. Alexander Kolevatov, who simulated a leg injury, provided a much needed delay. Or really injured leg - we are interested in not even the fact of trauma, but its deliberateness.
   We know that on the body of the deceased Kolevatov was found a weakened gauze bandage, slid to the left ankle. In life, this dressing covered, apparently, the shin or knee, and it was superimposed clearly not in the last hours of life - then the tourists were no longer up to the bandages. Yes, and they did not have a dressing under their arm - the whole remained in the tent. We also know that Alexander had a bruised bleeding from the inside of the left knee, so the assumption of applying a pressure bandage to the injured joint looks quite logical.

Anyway, the group that rose above the forest boundary and started climbing Holat-Syahyl was forced to stop moving forward and turned back into the forest. About this rise and return back we are known reliably from the last entry in Diatlov's diary, dated January 31: "Gradually move away from Auspia. The rise is smooth. We finished eating, went a rare birch tree. Here is the border of the forest. Nast. The place is bare. We need to choose a place to stay. We descend to the south - to the valley of Auspia. This is probably the most snowfall place. Tired, set to work overnight. A few firewood. The bonfire was bred on logs, a pit to dig a hole. Dinner in the tent. Heat…". About the formal reason for the return from the slope down can be guessed. However, we must admit that the trauma of Kolevatov (imaginary, real, accidental or deliberate - does not matter) would be a good reason for the group's return to the canopy of the forest and the establishment of the camp in the Auspii Valley.

In the afternoon of January 31 Igor Dyatlov's group rose above the forest border and jumped out onto the watershed between the valleys of the rivers Auspiya and Lozva. It was there, in a region of light forests and shrubs at an altitude of more than 700 m, and this photograph was taken by Georgi Krivonischenko. If the tourists continued their movement, crossed the pass and went to the Lozva Valley, the mountain of Kholat-Sahyl would remain to the left and behind the group. And no parking on the slope of Holat-Sahyl in the afternoon of February 1 would not have been under any circumstances. However, the group returned from the pass back to the valley of Auspia in order to repeat the labor-intensive ascent the next day. Very illogical actions, except to admit that within the group there was a "brake", deliberately not allowing the group to leave the area of ​​Mount Holat-Syahyl earlier than February 1.



Is this group's return accidentally linked to a man in whom we suspect a "confidential assistant" of the KGB? The question is rhetorical, the answer does not require, we suggest readers to think about this independently.
   So, on January 31, Igor Dyatlov's group breaks camp in the valley of the Auspiya River at the foot of Mount Holat-Syahyl. If the version of the "controlled delivery" is correct, then by that time on the mountain there were already persons who arrived there for acceptance of the cargo. There is no doubt that these people were supposed to advance to the area of ​​the supposed meeting in advance for a very obvious reason - they had to check all the movements in the "rendezvous point". From their attention depended both on their own survival and the performance of the operation: early monitoring of the terrain allowed foreign spetsnaz to detect possible ambushes of the KGB, cordoning or combing the terrain by troops. By the way, it is for better control of the surrounding terrain and access roads that most private reconnaissance meetings take place in sparsely populated areas such as parks, forest parks, reserves, areas of railroad alienation, on vacant lots, etc. Glamorous meetings in restaurants are decorated with television series, but in real life there is no place, and therefore the staff of all the intelligence services of the world in the zone of responsibility of their residents always carefully study all sorts of landfills, garbage dumps, forests and river valleys, and carefully fix all the detected landmarks. For in work it is useful!
   Therefore, the scouts of the opposing party, who had advance to the rendezvous area and who were already at the top of the Kholat-Syakhyl on January 31, undoubtedly drew attention to a strange group of tourists coming out of the woods that had ascended the slope, and then returned to the forest. The group's actions looked suspicious. First, the tourists appeared a day before the appointed time, and secondly, the number of the group turned out to be 9 people, instead of 10, as was expected from the beginning (Yudin returned from the route, which foreign intelligence agents did not know about). The group of foreign commandos, however, remained in place and continued to monitor. As there was no other suspicious activity in the controlled area, there seemed to be no reason to leave the meeting area.

Thus the day ended on January 31, 1959. The clock counted the last day of the life of the "Dyatlov group".
   It was February 1st. What was the weather like this day in the pass area? The question is far from idle, because the response to it largely depends on the assessment of the actions of the members of the group and a correct understanding of their motivation. Among the "professional tourists" and "knowing the matchmakers of the investigators of the tragedy" in this matter, we see a chaotic disagreement of opinions, so to speak, irritated soulful. A significant part of the "experts" believes that then the blizzard blew and the temperature did not rise all day above -25 ° C and even was much lower. This snowy whirlwind is regarded as an eerie cold. True, residents of St. Petersburg and Leningrad region, these terrible stories are unlikely to be misleading, because Severouralsk -25 ° C at 50% humidity of air are transported incomparably lighter than St. Petersburg -15 ° C at a humidity of 95%. And if we add to this the constantly bouncing wind from the Gulf of Finland with a speed of 10-15 m / s, then we can say with certainty that the inhabitants of the Vasilievsky Island live all winter in conditions not only comparable with the North Ural, but even many worse ones. And they do not perceive them as extraordinary.
   However, in fact, there was no-25 ° C in the area of ​​Ottöthen that day. The temperature was much higher. The Petersburg researcher of the tragedy of the group Evgeny V. Buyanov cited a summary of the weather in the Ivdelsky district in his books that day: the temperature during the day dropped to -20 ° C -21 ° C, the precipitation fell very little - about 0.5 mm, the humidity remained low - about 56%, north-north-west wind had a speed of 1-3 m / s. Ivdelsky district is almost half of Belgium, so the data is very inaccurate, however, still curious. As we see, no blizzards, snowstorms and storms; against the backdrop of disgusting Petersburg winter the weather seems to be a resort, and cold dry air could be healing for hundreds of thousands of St. Petersburg asthmatics. Nevertheless, the summary presented by E. V. Buyanov can not arrange us, since the air temperature -20 ° C corresponds to the end of the day, ie 23-24 hours, when all the participants of the Igor Diatlov's campaign were long dead. During the day, when the main events unfolded on the slope of Holat-Sahyl, the air was much warmer. But how much?

In fact, this is clearly evidenced by footprints of people walking down the slope. We see that the snow was hard pressed under the weight of the bodies, in other words, such snow could be played in snowballs. And this is possible in the temperature range from 0 ° C to -5 ° C, when the temperature is lower, the snow becomes so dry that it ceases to hold together. In addition to a purely empirical assessment made on the basis of life experience, there is a very remarkable objective evidence confirming the validity of the above assumption. On the very days when Igor Diatlov's group was moving to Oorten, a tourist group led by Sergei Sogrin (the same one in which Semyon Zolotaryov intended to go on a campaign at first) was sent by a 500-kilometer route through the Sable, Neroyka, Telpoz-Iz mountains. From the diaries of the participants in the campaign we know exactly the temperature in late January-early February 1959 in those places. For example, from the records of Victor Malyutin, we know that on January 31, the temperature in the morning, at the rise of the group, was -10 ° C, and during the day the air warmed to -5 ° C. And in his diary there is an interesting indication that snowflakes were melting on clothing, which indicates a temperature close to, or even exceeding 0 ° C, ie, a negative temperature, most likely, was a consequence of the error of the thermometer readings. The next day it was also warm, before the snow was snowing, then the sky cleared and the temperature began to drop, dropping to -16 ° C in the evening. A really strong frost hit only on the night of February 3, when the temperature dropped to -30 ° C.
   In those days the group of Sergei Sogrin went north of the "dyatlovites" by about 330-340 km, and this distance is overcome by the weather front for a day. The same cyclone as described in the diary of Victor Malyutin on January 31, 1959, caused warming and in some places snowfall; During the evening and night he descended to the south, towards Oorten. In the zone of its operation, Igor Dyatlov's group turned out to be on the morning of February 1. This assumption is in excellent agreement with the snow, sticking together under the feet of "dyatlovtsev", and with the weather forecast for the Ivdelsky district.

Here an attentive reader may have a reasonable question: how does this assumption correspond to the last photos of tourists from the camera of Georgy Krivonischenko, where they can be seen walking along a treeless slope in a snowy haze and snowstorms? After all, these photos clearly contradict the weather forecast, according to which there was practically no snowfall that day, and the wind speed was only 1-3 m / s! The contradiction is, however, seeming: there really was no snowfall, but there was a blizzard that carried snow from the place to the place. On the bare, devoid of vegetation, the slope of the Holat-Sahyl even in windless weather, wind gusts could well reach 10 m / s, and even more, thus creating conditions for a blizzard - in mountains such phenomena are constantly observed, but they are not related to movement atmospheric fronts, and local disturbances in the flow of complex surfaces around the air masses (incidentally, this phenomenon is observed all year round in the city, especially in high-rise areas). Such disturbances are short-lived and changeable, which creates a false impression of weather inconstancy. The last photos of Georgy Krivonischenko do not cancel the weather reports, they only recorded the weather at specific times. Literally in a few minutes after these photographs were taken, the wind could calm down, and the blizzard would stop, in order only to resume again in a quarter of an hour. However, in significant areas adjacent to the Holat-Syahyl - in the valleys of the rivers Auspiya and Lozva - there was little wind and it was not warm in winter.
   That is, on February 1, 1959, the weather as a whole "Dyatlovites" pleased. Especially in the morning and afternoon, when the wind was almost not felt and the air temperature was about 0 ° C. Comfortable weather clearly contributed to the fact that the group rose from sleep languidly and slowly (what in their diaries the "dyatlovites" themselves called "passive" rise). The low cloudiness and quiet, intermittent snowfall concealed the Sun and this circumstance did not allow the members of the group to correctly estimate the duration of the daylight (recall that in the previous days the group moved in a relatively flat terrain). Breakfast and the subsequent storage unit have reduced the already small stock of light time that was available to them. Only about 14 hours (perhaps, a little earlier) they began to feverishly gather, realizing that twilight in a mountainous area will come earlier than in the plain.
   The researcher of the tragedy of Igor Dyatlov's group Alexey Vladimirovich Koskin quite rightly drew attention to the fact that one of the last photographs on the shoulder of one of the "dyatlovists" clearly discerns a carelessly folded tent. Such negligence testifies to a few very interesting moments characterizing the latest tourist gatherings: they were in a hurry (there was no time for a neat folding of the long tent), they were supposed to move along the slope outside the forest zone (when walking through the forest, carelessly tattered canvas could be torn about twigs and branches) and finally, at the time of collection, they were not bothered by the wind (a poorly laid tent significantly increased the sail, which banally hindered the person who carried it.) If on that day there really was a strong wind, then t Risto would be not too lazy to spend the extra 5 minutes, but the tent was put as it should). This photo fits perfectly into that scheme of events on February 1, 1959, which can be provisionally called "hasty gatherings in good weather", but at the same time contradicts the widespread view, conventionally expressed by the formula "a hard transition to a terrible cold, winter storm."
   There was no winter storm that day, and there was no chilling wind at -25 ° C too!

Sunset Sun in an odd time confused all the cards and maybe caused some nervousness Kolevatov, Zolotaryov and Krivonischenko. When climbing the slope of Holat-Syahyl, the latter made the same pictures, on which we see a column of skiers, wandering through the snowy shroud. Perhaps these photos were made in the last minutes before sunset, when there was still hope to fix on a film with low photosensitivity (only 65 units), stuffed into Krivonischenko's camera, a more or less legible image.
   It can be assumed how the initiators of the operation from the KGB planned to hold a meeting with foreign agents and what instructions were received by Zolotarev, Kolevatov and Krivonischenko. Of course, it is impossible to state exactly all these nuances, but some moments are evident from the very specifics of the "controlled delivery" operation, implying the transfer of a certain cargo and the possibility of subsequent control both over its movement and the persons carrying this cargo. An important nuance, which needs to be clarified, boils down to the question: why did the Chekists use clothing that was heavily polluted with radioactive dust as a "bait-bait"? The logic is obvious - the transfer of clothes does not cause such suspicions, as, for example, the transfer of rags, stones or packages to the ground. In a tourist campaign, there may be a lot of situations that force you to ask for clothes from someone who can share - from her, clothes, wetting in the marsh in the summer, to spoilage at the fire in winter ("the orderly took a nap at the fire, burned felt boots and pants on his knees! it's impossible ... brothers, save the fool! "). To rescue a tourist brother with a spare sweater and pants is not just a beautiful act, but noble and masculine worthy. Moreover, such a case is an excellent occasion for formal dating. We do not know how the Committee intended to build an operational game in the future, it is quite possible that after a while a supposedly "accidental" meeting of Krivonischenko with someone from foreign agents, seen on the pass, in which he acted as a person who had already proved his reliability. In the language of operational work, this is called the "agent approach with good agent positions to the object being developed". In this case, the credibility of him was much higher than that of a stranger, which facilitated his inclusion in the operational game of foreign agents and very much helped the development of the combination that the KGB was preparing.
   Of course, all this is a naked theory of operational and investigative activity, we can not know what the Committee was preparing for foreign agents and what further destiny the operation that was taking place on the slope of Holat-Sahyl on February 1, 1959 should have. But all these considerations must be kept in mind , if we want to correctly understand the behavior in the situation of Zolotarev, Krivonischenko and Kolevatov, since this behavior was entirely dictated by the introductions of their curators from the Committee.

In order to organize surveillance of foreign agents in the places where they could appear (railway stations, railway stations, trains, bus stations, shopping and beer points in populated areas, etc.), they needed as much information as possible about their appearance, best of all photos. So, the Soviet counterintelligence, firstly, demanded from Zolotarev, Kolevatov and Krivonischenko to maintain a friendly manner of communication with persons who appeared behind the radioactive cargo. The reason for this requirement is obvious - this was intended to maximize the delay of the meeting. Secondly, it was necessary to get involved in the conversation of all agents who came into contact in order to memorize their voices and, if possible, find out the characteristic for each manner of conversation. Thirdly, Kolevatov and Krivonischenko were supposed to "work for" Zolotarev as extras, providing him with optimal conditions for taking photographs. Undoubtedly, Zolotarev was tasked with making photographs of foreign agents in full growth, and the subjects were to be received with precisely known dimensions (for example, ski poles or other people whose growth was known). Compliance with this requirement would allow to determine with high accuracy the growth of unknowns, even if they were photographed knee-deep in the snow.
   All these requirements dictated the behavior of Krivonischenko, Kolevatov and Zolotarev in a certain way in contact with foreign agents.
   The first such contact occurred on the slope of Holat-Sahyl, and, most likely, not far from the place where the tent of "dyatlovites" was installed (and subsequently found). Many searchers who visited in March 1959 on the spot said that Igor Diatlov's choice was difficult to understand, because the place for camping seemed unsuccessful. It did not look dangerous (the steepness of the slope, recall, is only 15 °, and this is less than the steepness of the staircase in a residential apartment house of a typical building or an escalator in the metro), rather, this place could be called uncomfortable and inconvenient. This sensation of "inconvenience" was expressed very clearly by Maslennikov, who said during the interrogation on March 10, 1959, literally the following: "To deliberately stop for an overnight stay in this place, knowing that this is the slope of the main ridge, Dyatlov could not." And this feeling seems quite logical and intuitively accurate - Igor Dyatlov really would not want to stop at this place voluntarily. The tent was broken up where it was found, forced. Immediately make a reservation that the word "forced" in this context does not at all mean "under duress".
   No, there was no compulsion at all! Simply, there was an unexpected (supposedly "unexpected"!) Meeting on the slope of Holat-Syahyl with some pretty tourists who fell out of the twilight snowy gloom with shouts of "hello, brothers! Where are you from? "Or something like that. There was a spontaneous conversation, quite friendly at first glance, with general questions about who, where and where to go ... Maybe Igor Dyatlov and would not want to stay at this place, maybe he intended to lead the group from the slope down to the valley of Lozva, where not was a stupid wind blowing, it seemed, from all sides, but only here Kolevatov and Krivonischenko were caught by the tongues with these men from whom the men had suddenly appeared ...

And then it became clear that there was no sense in going forward, for it would soon become really dark. Because of this, the tent should be placed where the group was caught by the darkness. Only two kilometers from the previous parking lot! "Professional woodpeckers", helplessly unraveling the riddle of the death of Igor Dyatlov's group for the last ten years, persist in trying to come up with an explanation for what drove the tourists out of the tent. They invented a lot of stupid things, from bears-rods, elk, yeti and sodium rocket engines (which, incidentally, could not in principle work in the atmosphere due to design features) - in general, they invented a lot of extra "essences", but at the same time did not understand the most important, obvious and principled riddle of this matter. And this puzzle lies in the question: why was the last transition of the group so short, just 2 km? In fact, even a little less, for 2 km are mentioned here, so to speak, "with a reserve". It is in the correct answer to this question that lies the answer to all the other riddles.
   Our answer is divided into 3 elements mutually related and complementing each other: 1) Igor Dyatlov and all the other members of his group incorrectly estimated the duration of the daylight in the mountainous terrain, and therefore they left the camp in the valley of the Auspiya River late, 2) the movement of the group along the slope of the Holat -Syahyl was prevented by an unexpected meeting with another tourist group (unexpected for everyone except Zolotarev, Kolevatov and Krivonischenko), and finally, 3) this meeting initially did not pose a threat to the group, because the "woodpeckers" in a calm atmosphere They set about setting up a tent, conducted this production correctly, without haste - on skis and skates on the snow - and almost finished it.
   The threat arose at the very end of the tent's setting and this threat was directly related to the meeting on the slope.
   Rapid transfer of clothes with traces of radioactive dust at a meeting on the slope did not happen, although the passwords necessary for this purpose and the responses were pronounced. Foreign agents realized that they met those whom they needed, the same was understood by the members of the Djatlov group, who were devoted to the plan of the KGB operation. However, carrying out the order to tighten the meeting as much as possible, Krivonishenko did not give clothes, suggesting to meet a little later, after setting up the tent. In principle, such a proposal looked quite ordinary - one group of tourists invited another to visit, so that in itself the transfer of the moment of transfer of things looked logical and justified. Moreover, Zolotaryov, Krivonischenko and Kolevatov planned this combination in advance, discussed the details of the conversation and were ready for it. Perhaps everything was played out so that the transfer of clothing on the slope might look too suspicious and the foreign agents themselves had to understand this. Another thing is important for us - foreign agents had to agree to a re-meeting after a while and they promised to make such a courtesy visit to Igor Dyatlov's camp.

However, during the first meeting, there was an event - or several events - though initially seemingly insignificant, but had far-reaching consequences. Something caused the alertness of the group that appeared at the meeting; perhaps this alertness turned out to be mutual. What kind of events were exactly what no one would say, simply because their members were not alive. Suspicion could have caused a mistake in the speech turnover committed by a foreign agent and noticed by the "dyatlovites", a misunderstood and used idiom, an inability to understand the humor of an anecdote familiar to the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. On the language training of their agents, all intelligence services of the world pay the most serious attention, but to exclude the linguistic "puncture" is completely impossible, since even native speakers outside the traditional language environment noticeably lose their conversational skills in a few years. Suspicion of tourists could be caused by the accent that appeared on the slope of Holat-Syahyl people. There can be no 100% certainty that for this operation, foreign intelligence used ethnic Russians. It is known that the British intelligence service SIS gave instructions related to the penetration into the regions of the Urals and Siberia of immigrants from the Baltic countries - Latvians and Estonians - speaking with a noticeable accent (this had its own logic, since in 1940 and in the postwar period, a large number of people deported from this region - former landowners, officials, etc. By the way Velikyavichus, the same driver with a horse that took the things of Igor Dyatlov's group to the abandoned village Severny-2, was an ethnic Lithuanian convicted in 1950. and we will move from the "zone" to the "settlement" in 6 years). And here, for example, the MINOS special reconnaissance unit, created in the first half of the 50's. in the French intelligence SDESE and widely involved in the illegal shipment of agents in the USSR by merchant marine ships, used the Serbs. And how many of you, dear readers, will distinguish a Serb from a Georgian or, say, a Baku Jew, especially if the Serb himself claims to be such a Jew? I assure you, do not distinguish, at least not at the first conversation ...
   If one of the members of Igor Dyatlov's group drew attention to the accent of strangers and started asking questions about this, this behavior could certainly cause alarm and even panic for the agents of foreign intelligence attending the meeting. One should not lose sight of the fact that foreign scouts felt "like at war" - they were on a combat mission in a hostile environment, they realized that they were risking everything, so that their nerves were tense ... Finally, one can not exclude the fact that they themselves Krivonischenko, Kolevatov, or Zolotaryov did not fulfill their tasks quite successfully, provoking questions and distrust. It is also possible that someone drew attention to the attempts of Semen Zolotarev to take photographs in conditions of clearly insufficient illumination and a few words said on this subject was enough to bury the spies in suspicion. Finally, bearing in mind that for some reason two cameras disappeared from the tent (presumably Thibo Brignol and Kolmogorova), one can not exclude the fact that it was not Zolotaryov who "pierced" with the photo shooting, but someone from tourists who had nothing to do with the operation The KGB.
   In general, you can imagine any, according to the mind, common sense and life experience.

Whatever it was, the first meeting ended peacefully and even with a demonstration of showy friendliness. This can be no doubt, since at its other end, the tents of the "Dyatlovites" on the slope simply would not have been - Zolotarev (along with Kolevatov and Krivonischenko) would have made the group leave the slope and attempt to break away from the unfamiliar "tourists". This, as we know, did not happen and the tourists put the tent on the slope of Holat-Syahyl in a regular way. Once again, Igor Dyatlov was forced to authorize the staging of the tent almost at the very place where the meeting with the unknown had occurred, and the members of his own group - the same Zolotarev, Kolevatov and Krivonischenko, who were more friendly than others from the others from nowhere to strangers. Sam Dyatlov, maybe he did not want to camp on the slope, but his friends persuaded him, say, we'll put up a tent, we'll have brothers-tourists, spirits for twenty drops we'll pour out, we'll stretch our legs, chat with souls, jokes-songs, couplets, then yes, in the end, you have to give them clothes if they ask, and tomorrow we'll make a march-throw and catch up with the backlog.
   Once again, we emphasize a fundamentally important point: Igor Dyatlov's group could and should have moved from the Auspii Valley to the Lozva Valley that day - this was the main task for the day. And even a short light day in principle could not prevent the group from doing this. Just because the distance was very small - only 3.0-3.5 km. Even in the most disgusting conditions of the campaign - in the frost and in the forest, more often with a windbreak, such a transition would not require more than 2 hours. But on the slope there was neither frost nor rain. Even in the conditions of a short daylight, the "Dyatlovites" had to pass without difficulty into the Lozva Valley and break up the camp there. Let it be in the twilight, even in a hurry and even cursing, but nevertheless have time ... There was nothing fatal in such a transition. Instead, they put the tent on the slope almost in the middle of the road, at the most uncomfortable point of the day's transition.
   Maslennikov, the chief Sverdlovsk tourism specialist of that time, during interrogations in the prosecutor's office a few months later suggested that Djatlov made a mistake with the direction and took a trip to the slope of Holat-Syahyl by mistake, hoping to actually cross the pass, which later received his name. Roughly speaking, Dyatlov had to be kept straight, and he led the group to the left. But! .. Even admitting such an error, Igor Dyatlov could fix it without any difficulties, for this it was enough for him to lead the group down the slope. Already the direction "up" and "down" the group could distinguish in any weather, with any visibility. And down there, almost calm, a quiet lacuna with an air temperature of about -5 ° C, so contrasting with a gusty wind on the slope, throwing snow in the face from the drifting snowdrifts. Nothing, it seems, did not prevent the group from moving to the Lozva Valley, except for one - the human factor. Setting up a tent on a slope can only be explained by the influence of the human factor, and one that the members of the group themselves did not regard as threatening. At least, originally.

What followed? Two groups of tourists for a while dispersed: the "dyatlovites" began to look for and found a place for setting up the tent, and the travelers who met them and did not receive the clothes they needed climbed to their camp, which already existed on the top of the Holat-Syahyl (or somewhere near the top, at a point providing good visual control over the approaches to the mountain from the south and east). There, most likely, they were waiting for another member of the group, guarding the property. Foreign agents could not be many, hardly more than three people, this can be definitely judged by the nature of their actions. Undoubtedly, there was an exchange of views between them about the last meeting and a thorough analysis of its details. The moments that aroused suspicion were qualified as evidence of the work of Igor Dyatlov's group members on the USSR State Security Committee. In other words, the agents "deciphered" the Soviet counterintelligence base. And if so, the operation itself to get clothes with isotope dust, as long as it passed under the control of the KGB, lost all meaning in their eyes.
   As a result of the discussion of the situation, foreign agents decided to liquidate the entire group, as selective murder of suspicious persons did not ensure their safety in the future. How could this be done? Technically, it was easy to do this, using firearms and cold steel, which, of course, the agents thrown into the interior of the USSR had at their disposal. But there was no doubt that the dead group would be searched and unambiguously found. And, it is not known how soon this will happen. Suddenly, in the footsteps of this group there is another one and in a day or two or three in the area of ​​Holat-Syahyl there will be people? Yes, even with a radio ... Clearly, the criminal death of tourists will tell the KGB about what happened eloquently and accurately. At all stations and polustankah of the Ural region, police patrols will be on duty, all agents of the state security and internal affairs will be focused on the detection of suspicious persons, and the killers will be enclosed, as if by wolves flags. No, for agents of foreign intelligence it was, obviously, a suboptimal way out. It was necessary to kill the group in such a way that the death of people looked as if it were not criminal. It was poisoning, because you could be sure that the Sverdlovsk Regional Bureau of Forensic Medicine, equipped far from the last word of science and technology, is unlikely to determine any exotic alkaloid, which undoubtedly had the best intelligence in the world. But the poisoning of nine people gave rise to many practical questions: which poison (instantaneous or delayed)? how to give it (imperceptibly or openly, under the threat of weapons)? how to deal with bodies poisoned after the murder (simulate the scene of the accident or leave it as it will)? finally, how to deal with those who can not be poisoned unnoticed? It seems that the group poisoning was abandoned precisely because of the difficulty of its practical implementation, especially since the winter Ural weather prompted a much more realistic plan - to freeze the group out by stripping it - stripped and unscrewed - into the snow under the threat of weapons. Trivial and effective.

Cold killing was widely practiced both in the GULAG "zones" and in German concentration camps. The death of General Karbyshev, frozen by the fascists as part of a large group of prisoners of war, was not at all something exceptional, the deaths of prisoners of concentration camps from hypothermia are known in a variety. There is reliable information also that in many Soviet prisons there were both "hot" and "cold" chambers for prolonged torture of prisoners. Foreign agents warned of the possible use of cold torture against them in the event of detention by the Soviet security authorities. So the idea to freeze a group of Dyatlov was hardly any spontaneous fiction, born on the run by the impromptu - no, most likely it was one of those "blanks" in the case of disguised murder, who understood the learning process in the intelligence school.
   The most important element of this kind of murder, its specificity, consisted in the fact that the victim until the last minutes should not have understood what the fate was for her. The victim had to rest assured that in a minute or two the situation would be clarified, all problems would be successfully removed and the conflict would resolve itself. The condition to observe this was absolutely necessary, because once the victim guessed that what was happening pursued only one goal - her murder, then on her part the active defense was inevitable, and, consequently, the emergence of specific wounds. And this foreign agents just intended to avoid.
   Obviously, the attack should have consisted of a series of successively implemented stages: a) disarming the group (since it was assumed that KGB officers could be armed); b) depriving the members of the group of warm clothes (hats, gloves and shoes); c) expelling people to frost, away from the parking lot; d) carrying out a search in the tent in order to locate the camera, which took pictures of the meeting on the slope and the deterioration of the photographed film (in the event that foreign agents noticed an attempt to photograph them); e) the deterioration of the tent, in order to exclude its further use (in the event that someone from the group returns in the absence of attackers); f) confirmation of the death of all members of the group a few hours after the expulsion of tourists to frost (or the next morning). After clarifying all the necessary details, foreign agents descended to the camp of Igor Dyatlov's group.