Chapter15 (Physical and technical expertise)

Physical and technical expertise. Termination of the investigation, closing of the criminal case.


So, on May 9, 1959, the forensic medical expert completed his mournful work and the bodies of four tourists found in the ravine were sent to Sverdlovsk for giving ground. The dead were in closed coffins and their bodies were not shown to relatives, only the father of Lyudmila Dubinina, Alexander Nikolayevich, managed to achieve an exception for him. Having seen the remains of his daughter, he almost lost his senses.
   The coffin with the body of Semyon Zolotarev was taken away by his mother, who came from the North Caucasus, the other three tourists were buried in the Mikhailovsky Cemetery next to their bandmates, whose bodies were found in February and March. Now there is a general monument with photographs of tourists, as well as Nikitin, buried here. There are among them pictures of Krivonischenko and Zolotarev, although their burial places are elsewhere.
   During the May funeral, there was a heart-breaking moment. So, for example, the mother of Nikolai Thibault-Brignol remembered how she did not want to leave her son on this January campaign, persuaded him to end his tourist trips to nature, they say, he has not already left the school, he's graduated, it's time to grow up.


Kolya promised his mother that this trip would be the last in his life ... So it happened.


   How strange: Kolya Thibaut promised his mother that this campaign would be the last in his life-and he kept his promise to this death.

A similar story was told by the parents of Lyudmila Dubinina. Literally two days before the start of the campaign, they were given an apartment in a large building, from several buildings, a house in the street of the Decembrists. Moving and repairing is always a troublesome business, especially for Luda's younger brother in the coming days to go to pre-diploma practice in another city. In general, an extra pair of hands during the move would not hurt and the parents persuaded her daughter not to go to Oorten. Did not listen!


Photo from the last hike. From left to right: Igor Dyatlov, leaning towards the photographer, Semyon Zolotaryov, Lyudmila Dubinina and Sasha Kolevatov, shaking out the ashes from the homemade stove (Pay attention to the Finnish knife on the belt of Kolevatov.) Special attention is to the tent, more precisely, the suspension of her skate on the rope-brace , which is fixed on nearby trees). Considering the photographs of this campaign, it is difficult to resist the idea that Luda clearly gravitated toward the older members of the group - Zolotarev and Thibault. We will have to deal with the "psychological profiles" of the participants of the campaign, because their personal preferences clearly influenced the decision-making in the last hours of their lives.


And how bitter it was now to remember this to parents ...
   The presentation of the plot of the investigation will be far from complete unless you touch on the final part of it - a strange and inexplicable at first glance plot zigzag associated with the notorious radiological examination. This is one of the darkest (and unexplained until now) moments of investigation.
   What is it about?
   During the week - from May 18 to May 25, 1959 - the radiological laboratory of the Sverdlovsk City Sanitary and Epidemiological Station conducted research on biological materials extracted from the bodies of Dubinina, Zolotarev, Kolevatov and Thibo Brignol, as well as their clothes, for the detection of radioactive substances . In total, 10 fragments of clothes taken from the bodies of the dead, and 25 biosubstrates were subjected to research. In addition, during the examination, the radioactivity of the biological materials of the nameless corpse from Sverdlovsk was checked, the data on which were considered as reference. About what Sverdlovsk radiologists have discovered, will be discussed below, while we will make absolutely necessary in this place a remark.
   In those early times, radioactivity was perceived completely differently than it is today. On the one hand, there was a clear underestimation of harmful radiation factors, especially neutron radiation, which led to the creation of neutron munitions with a noticeable delay (this version of thermonuclear weapons only appeared in the mid-1970s). The first reactors for the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons did not have the first heat exchange circuit isolated from the external environment, in other words, the steam passed through the reactor after condensation in the refrigerator was banally merged into a lake-heat exchanger. The fuel elements for the submarine reactor in the territory of the naval bases were stored in the open air behind the usual wooden fence, like logs in the country. Very active isotopes were widely used to display indications for various military equipment and "commander's" hours ... Examples can be continued, but I think the idea is quite understandable.
   But on the other hand, fissile materials were not yet widely used in everyday life - they were not in medicine, in fire alarm devices, etc. Therefore, in the Soviet Union, the source of radioactivity could occur only from two areas of life - from the army or the military industry. Both spheres were supervised by the state security, the all-powerful KGB, which considered any signal about the appearance of radioactivity from one point of view: "Is there a threat to the state security of the USSR in the event?" The threat to the health of Soviet people or the loss of super-expensive fissile materials was already secondary, in the foreground For the KGB, there was always a threat to state secrets.

Which, in principle, is logical.
   In view of the foregoing, the investigator's own proposal to verify the bodies of deceased tourists and their clothes for radioactivity is tantamount to offering to involve the KGB in the case. For that time it was only so. The idea of ​​appointing a radiological examination could not have occurred to investigator Ivanov on the level ground, simply because there was nothing to do. For such an examination there should have been some objective indicators ... or a certain demand, a serious one so that it could not be ignored.
   In the case materials there are no objective prerequisites to suspect the presence of radioactive materials at the site of the tragedy of the Dyatlov group. And the tradition of checking the clothes of all corpses with a dosimeter in the USSR in 1959 did not exist, as it does not exist in Russia today. Therefore, someone very strongly recommended the investigator to conduct a radiological examination. Ivanov himself did not need this expertise - the case clearly went under the closure and he would calmly close it without unnecessary red tape. The corpses are found, there are no traces of strangers at the scene of the crime, so why pull the rubber, right? But no, he was given a command (or recommendation - whatever) and from such a serious level that the investigator Ivanov had only to take under the visor and answer "is!"
   The most interesting thing is that the examination was not in vain - it really found traces of radioactivity. We can say that this was perhaps the only hit of the investigation "in the top ten". Against the backdrop of fruitless interrogations of Mansi about "prayer stones", the soldiers of the internal troops about the "glowing balls" and the glibbery identification of things here we see a quite logical (and most importantly - effective!) Investigative action. It seems to be at random, but what a lucky one!
   There is a strong suspicion that the success of the radiological examination was not accidental at all. In other words, those who recommended (or ordered) Ivanov to appoint her, knew perfectly well what the result should be. And this is the biggest mystery of the "Dyatlov affair", and not at all in the broken skull of Thibault Brignol and not in the broken ribs of Zolotarev, it's there that everything explains very simply how we will see it in our time! The main intrigue is in an unexpected, illogical, inappropriate and at the same time such a successful radiological examination.
   So what did specialists of the Sverdlovsk Radiological Laboratory discover?
   Biosubstrates, extracted from the bodies of four dead tourists found in the ravine, showed that the bodies of the dead were not radioactive. To be more precise, there was no excess of activity due to the natural presence of isotopes in the human body. This meant that Dubinina, Zolotarev, Kolevatov and Thibault Brignol did not drink contaminated water and did not inhale radioactive dust - in general, they did not receive radiation in any form.
   In addition, there were no radioactive elements in the ground from the creek - it was also checked by foreseefully taking a sample from the corpse, designated No. 1.
   But on three pieces of clothing were found traces of radioactive contamination. Although their owners were numbered and in the act of examination they were not named by their names (as well as "sharovarov from No. (such and such)", "a brown sweater from No. (edakogo)"), it is known that this numbering coincides with the numbering in the criminal case acts of forensic medical examinations of bodies found in the ravine. In other words, under No. 1 in the text of the physical and technical expertise Kolevatov appears, under No. 2 - Zolotarev, under No. 3 - Thibo Brignol and under No. 4 - Dubinin. Radioactivity on the three garments mentioned was local, i.e., focal and grouped into separate fragments. The areas of "peak" radiation intensity in each case were small - no more than 100 cm square. tissue. For a sweater, found on the body of Lyudmila Dubinina, the maximum activity of a plot of 75 cm square. amounted to 9900 decays per minute (165 Bq), for a piece of cloth on the lower part of the sharovar Kolevatov with an area of ​​55 cm square. - 5000 dpm. (83 Bq), and for the belt fragment of his sweater of 70 cm square. 5600 dpm. (93 Bq). After they were placed in running water for 3 hours, there was a noticeable decrease in the radioactive background (by 30% -60%). This meant that the threads themselves, which went for the manufacture of sweaters and pants, were radioactive, and the dust settled on them, which was washed off with water.

Which isotope (or isotope mixture) is the source of radiation is unknown. The laboratory sensor recorded beta radiation, which was a consequence of the decay of atoms; alpha and gamma radiation were not detected.
   How big are the recorded emissions and what kind of danger did they present to the wearers? In principle, the detected activity was very small and not dangerous. A small example: the beginning of the 60's. domestic radiology already had an idea of ​​such a very dangerous phenomenon for human health, like the accumulation in the bones of the isotope strontium-90 (Sr-90), capable of falling into a body with radioactive dust after a nuclear explosion. So, for strontium-90, which got into the lungs of a person with breathing and began its journey through the body, a limit dose of permissible activity equal to 2 milliCurie (2 mCi) was established. Having translated milliCurie in Becquerel, we see that Soviet medicine considered the value of 74 million Becquerels threshold. Anything below was considered acceptable. In our case, the bill goes to hundreds of Becquerels, in principle, it is a mere trifle. It is possible to refer to modern representations from this field: according to the radiation safety standards in Russia since 1999 (NRB-99/2009), the specific effective activity of natural radionuclides in building materials should not exceed 370 Bq / kg. And in neighboring Belarus, fungi with the same specific activity are permissible for ingestion.
   However, it should be taken into account that clothing for a long time - according to the investigation from about the middle of April 1959 - was in the water and radioactive dust from it was gradually washed away. At least this point of view was postulated by the investigation.
   But maybe the investigation in this question was wrong and radioactivity hit the clothes precisely from snow, water or soil? Maybe the only sample of the soil is not indicative and the focus of infection was actually in the ravine? After all, not very far away - only 1250 km to the north was the nuclear test site on Novaya Zemlya. Could radioactive isotopes be brought from there?
   This very speculative assumption is upheld by Mr. Buyanov, one of the most competent researchers of the tragedy of Igor Dyatlov. But the arguments of Mr. Buyanov not only prove nothing, but on the contrary - only testify to his own complete ignorance in this matter.
   First of all, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that all nuclear explosions in the USSR accompanied by the release of radionuclides into the atmosphere were planned and implemented with the expectation that the clouds formed with radioactive dust would be carried away by airflows outside the country (i.e., to the arctic zones of the USA and Canada - in the case of explosions on Novaya Zemlya, and to China - with explosions at the Semipalatinsk test site). As we reliably know from the documents of the JCAE (Atomic Energy Commission of the US Congress), the Soviet Union in the last weeks before the introduction of the moratorium on nuclear testing in November 1958, heavily exploded nuclear and toremuclear ammunition in the northern regions. From September 20, 1958 to October 17, 1958, 12 thermonuclear charges of various capacities, 2 of which were of a megaton class, were detonated on a new landfill. From October 18 to October 25, 1958-that is, in just one week-another 6 nuclear weapons were blown up on Novaya Zemlya, including 1 low-power nuclear power and 5 thermonuclear megaton classes. Finally, on November 1 and 3, 1958, explosions of two more low-power atomic charges were carried out in Siberia.

Well, after that the Soviet Union until September 1, 1961 was in a state of a moratorium on nuclear tests and nothing that could produce radioactive fallout did not explode.
   Despite the large series of atomic and thermonuclear explosions in the atmosphere carried out in the USSR during the period September-November 1958, with Mr. Buyanov's desire from Novaya Zemlya to the region of Otortan, nothing could be inflated - the whole radionuclide "bouquet" was received by gentlemen from NATO .
   But even if one takes the viewpoint of Mr. Buyanov and believes that, due to some technical or meteorological malfunction, a cloud of radioactive dust flew in the vicinity of the mountain of Holatchahl and was spilled there with heavy rain, infecting the soil, anyway with "mud" from the creek comes a non-main line of principle. The fact is that nuclear and thermonuclear explosions produce short-lived isotopes. Their activity decreases very quickly. There is a mnemonic "rule of the sevens" visually demonstrating the rate of decrease in the radioactivity of nuclear explosion products. According to him, the level of radiation in the terrain is reduced by 10 times through time intervals, equal to the degree with the base of 7 hours (the error of this observation does not exceed 25%). In other words, 7 hours after the explosion radioactivity is reduced by 10 times, and after 7 * 7 hours - by 100 times. After 7 * 7 * 7 hours (ie, 2 weeks) the fall in radioactivity will be 1000 times already. This is taught us by the course of the "Civil Defense", with which Mr. Buyanov - alas! - It is unfamiliar, but he can not undo it. Even the epicenter of the megaton thermonuclear explosion is available for people deprived of personal protective equipment on the fifth day without a serious threat to health.
   It is for this simple reason that the erased by the Americans from the face of the earth Hiroshima and Nagasaki were very quickly restored and became absolutely safe for living a few months after the bombing.
   So, even if you believe for a moment, as if in the fall of 1958 on the North. Ural and radioactive dust from Novaya Zemlya, then for the period from November 3, 1958 (the announcement of a moratorium on nuclear tests) until February 1, 1959 (when the clothes of the "woodpeckers" were in a ravine), this dust lost its activity to such an extent, that could not accumulate on clothes foci, exceeding the surrounding background at times.
   And this conclusion is directly confirmed by the conclusion of a radiological (physical and technical) examination: the soil seized at the place of detection of corpses, having passed due verification, did not show any appreciable radioactivity. Well, that is, in general - in the table we see dashes.

Therefore, with absolute reliability, it can be argued that in the stream radioactive dust from the clothes of the deceased "dyatlovites" was washed away, rather than washed up. This process lasted quite a long time - from 6 to 14 days. As the forensic medical examination on the condition of the lungs, nails, hair and epidermis reliably established, it was so much the bodies of Dubinina and Thibault Brignol that were in the water. So, the initial level of radioactive contamination of Krivonischenko's clothes found on them was significantly higher than that recorded by the physical and technical expertise in May 1959. Many times, perhaps even on the orders - just now no one can say.
   That is why radioactive clothing automatically became a problem of state security.
   Nobody could keep such clothes at home and go hiking in it. It's not because it harmed your health - that's what bothered the KGB least of all - but because the radioactive dust could tell a lot about the owner's job.
   And here the investigation was supposed to score a real alarm, because it was not about mythical Mansi or "fireballs," which for no one were dangerous! Now the question was to stand like this: an objective confirmation of the existing threat to state security was found, what should be done?
   Enchanting response to him immediately followed - to close the case! May 28, 1959, a resolution was issued on the termination of the investigation. All the essential part of this document can be reduced to several lines, which will be quoted verbatim: "Given the absence of external injuries and signs of struggle on the corpses, the presence of all the values ​​of the group, and taking into account the conclusion of the forensic medical examination on the causes of death of tourists, that the reason for the death of tourists was an elemental force that tourists were unable to overcome. (...) not seeing in the present case the corpus delicti, guided by paragraphs 5 and 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR, ruled: the criminal case on the death of a group of tourists by further production should be stopped. "
   No comments. Readers of this essay are able to draw conclusions independently.

In the resolution "on the termination of the criminal case" there are curious moments, which should be noted (some of which we have already touched on, others will have to be discussed below). So, for example, already in the first sentence of the determining part of this document the deceased group was called "amateur", which did not correspond to reality. Investigator Ivanov rudely mistook the timing of the installation of the tent on the slope of the Holat-Sahyl and the weather at which it happened. In the resolution, neither the radiological examination nor the radioactive items of incomprehensible origin are mentioned. The nature of the "spontaneous force", which allegedly destroyed the group, has not been uncovered. The assertion that "the absence of external injuries on the corpses" contradicts not only the truth, but also the documents of the very business that this epic labor crowns. The document is clearly intended for acquaintance with the relatives of the deceased and is, of course, made very cleverly, which is only a phrase about the undetection of "traces of the presence of other people." It is all the more remarkable that the investigation did not reveal many traces of the "woodpeckers" themselves, which should have existed - for example, the traces of Zina Kolmogorova and Igor Dyatlov climbing uphill. However, the author of the resolution did not experience any embarrassment from his own illogicality. A wonderful example of the legal gift of the investigator Lev Ivanov.
      The factual part of the investigation is exhausted, the investigation ends with the above decree. One can be surprised at the document that came out of Leo Nikitovich Ivanov's pen, one can be indignant, one can build any assumptions, but one should recognize in the similar outcome of the investigation one undoubted positive aspect - the investigator did not blame the dead tourists for anything. The hardest wording addressed to them was verbatim as follows: "Woodpeckers were in disadvantageous conditions of spending the night and decided to break the tent on the slope (...)". Ivanov postulated, in general, quite obvious to any conclusion and then did not go. The general idea of ​​the decision to terminate the case, which summed up the investigation, can be expressed in only two words: there are no guilty. In principle, such a conclusion in the situation was optimal, but ...