Already from the very beginning of comprehension of the version of the "controlled delivery", the assumption about the presence of a second person next to Zolotaryov, connected with the Committee, made one pay close attention to those who were found together with him in the ravine. There was no doubt that this "Second" in the moment of unpredictable development of the situation on the slope of the Holat-Syahyl in its actions was to focus on Zolotarev. If only because he knew the true face of Semyon and understood that he must be "whole head". This consideration immediately limited the "computation" of the mysterious "Second" to one of the two candidates - Nikolai Thibault-Brignol and Alexander Kolevatov.
The first, it seems, perfectly suited this role, first of all by the fact that, like Zolotarev, he was almost fully dressed, that is, he is better than others in the unexpected. However, this argument was parried by other arguments that destroyed it at the root. Suffice it to mention just one of such arguments, which made it impossible to participate in the secret operation of the KGB - Thibault Brignol - Nikolai came from a repressed family, which meant that he could potentially be disloyal to the Soviet authorities and the special services that defended her. For us it does not matter how justified such an assumption could be, it is important that when evaluating the personality of Nikolai Thibault by the KGB, this "minus" outweighed all of its "pluses."
Remained Alexander Kolevatov, but he until then seemed like a kind of "dark horse," about which and say something especially nothing. At first glance, an ordinary fourth-year student of the Faculty of Physics and Technology of UPI, a hereditary Urals, like the rest of the group (apart from Semen Zolotarev, Georgy Krivonischenko and Rustem Slobodin). The alleged connection of this man with the KGB was not visible at all, and any other participant in the march could be suspected as well - both of Yuri Doroshenko and Igor Dyatlov ... However, the assessment of this person immediately becomes ambiguous if we recall the documents discovered by Alexei Vladimirovich Koskin - a description of Alexander Kolevatov and the latter's statement about the admission to the 2nd course of the Sverdlovsk Polytech.
This small, it would seem, discovery allows you to evaluate the life of Alexander Kolevatov in a completely new way. What do we see? In 1953 a 19-year-old young man graduated from the mining and metallurgical college in Sverdlovsk and was distributed in Moscow. And not just in Moscow, but in one of the most secret research institutions of the USSR, created as part of the implementation of the "uranium project." It is about the so-called. Created in May 1946 in the 9th Department of the NKVD of the USSR. laboratory "B", focused on the creation of protection against ionizing radiation. This laboratory, which grew literally within a year to the size of the institute, was located first in Chelyabinsk, and after 1949 moved to Chelyabinsk-40 ... yes, the very same "atomic city" where Georgy Krivonishchenko later worked, and where in September 1957 one of the world's largest nuclear technological disasters occurred. In January 1953 this nameless "numbered" institution (PO Box No. 3394) was transferred to Moscow, where, over time, it was transferred to the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and appropriated the non-spoken name of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic Materials (renaming took place in January 1967). It was headed by this worthy institution from the very moment of its creation, Alexander Konstantinovich Uralets-Ketov, it is his signature that flaunts under the characterization of Alexander Kolevatov, which was mentioned just above.
Get a job in Moscow in the early 50's. it was very, very difficult. The capital provided its residents with the maximum possible amenities - an established supply of food and industrial goods, stable urban transport, public order, exemplary municipal services. There were the best theaters and the most interesting art exhibitions, there appeared literary novelties, here the intellectual color of Soviet society worked. Alexander Tvardovsky not accidentally wrote about Moscow those years: "the capital is rewarded." The propiska system worked in such a way that it cut off all those who came to find work independently. Work in Moscow received only Muscovites, finding a job in the capital for a nonresident resident meant pulling out a winning lottery ticket.
Alexander Kolevatov got this ticket. A graduate of a very ordinary mining and metallurgical college from a remote provincial Sverdlovsk managed to get into distribution to Moscow, to a secret research institute. In principle, a very good life start - a stable job with a 15% surcharge for secrecy, a residence permit in the capital, a place in the hostel, a sense of belonging to a great state cause (which is very important for a young man). Alexander was surrounded by interesting people; was involved in the most advanced scientific research in the world (even as a senior laboratory assistant); he found time for leisure and hobbies - engaged in bullet shooting, went on hikes. During his "Moscow period" of life, Kolevatov visited Mount Sabler in the Subpolar Urals, about 300 km north of Ottoten. He was not called into the army, since work in the defense research institute provided Alexander with "a reservation." In general, a good life start, very good. In the position of senior laboratory assistant, Alexander Kolevatov worked as a young specialist for 3 years - from August 1953 to September 1956.
In 1955 he entered the All-Union Correspondence Polytechnic Institute. The purpose of admission is obvious - the receipt of higher education in low blood. In Soviet times, without distance learning was not without reason considered "free", as the load on students of the day-time form of training was much higher. "Extramural students" were usually people from other cities, had work experience, were often burdened with families and teachers treated them with some degree of indulgence. Meanwhile, the diplomas of correspondence and full-time study did not differ in any way and the diploma obtained after the end of the daytime department did not give any privileges to its owner. For Alexander Kolevatov, training in VZPI was a real gift - he continued to work quietly in the Moscow "mail box", enjoyed paid holidays for the session period and, not particularly burdened with learning, could wait for the time when he would become the owner of the cherished blue book with an embossed inscription "diploma".
However, after the end of the first course of the All-Union correspondence "polytechnic" in the life of Kolevatov, something strange and illogical occurred: Alexander suddenly decided to change the institute. And not just an institution, but also a form of training - instead of correspondence, go to day school. And so, quit your job. And since he decided to study at the Sverdlovsk UPI, he also had to change his place of residence: by abandoning Moscow, to return to Sverdlovsk. This decision should be recognized as completely inexplicable and from all points of view losing. Drawing parallels with the modern way of life, we can say that a person refused a career in the company "Toyota" and returned from Tokyo in order to weed beds in the dacha in his native Uryupinsk. Uryupinsk, of course, the city is also quite good, but the life prospects in it are incomparable with those that open in Tokyo.
It is naive to think that young people in the mid-fifties of the last century were deprived of pragmatism and understanding of common sense. And let the cinema and literature of those years diligently draw before us the images of such candy-lovers with enthusiastic eyes, in fact, the youth of that time was not so one-dimensional.
But the stranger it is to move from Moscow to Sverdlovsk. For this move, not solving problems, only created new ones. Kolevatov lost his job and, accordingly, he faced the task of replacing the money that had fallen out of his personal budget. Instead of a measured study in a correspondence university, requiring stress only for the period of sessions (and at that time he was paid vacation at the place of work!), Kolevatov had to adapt to a completely different schedule, much more intense. Of course, after becoming a full-time student, he received all those bonuses that so embellish student life at all times, but to exaggerate the value of hilarious pastime is still worth it. And most importantly, Kolevatov changed the Moscow residence permit to Sverdlovsk, and at that time it was a completely unequal substitute.
Moving to Sverdlovsk could be explained by dismissal from work, they say, having lost the source of income, Alexander decided to return to his homeland. But we know that the order of events was the reverse - Kolevatov first moved from the correspondence "Polytech" to Sverdlovsk and only then was fired. Moreover, the reason for the dismissal was just "going to study at a university", that is, in UPI, because studying in the All-Union correspondence "Polytech" did not interfere with the work.
What happened? A clear analogy arises with the situation that we saw in the case of Semyon Zolotarev, that is, a person moved to the Urals from a much more prosperous region. At such a step, a person is not decided at all because of altruism, no one in the USSR has refused to register with Moscow only in order to be closer to a beloved girl or a sick mother. For such a step, not only very good reasons were required, but the grounds were permanent, that is, those whose actions would last for many years. Just these reasons can not always be seen or interpreted correctly by others. Obviously, studying in the Sverdlovsk "polytechnic" gave Kolevatov some serious advantages that could not be obtained at the UZPI. What could it be?
First of all, in the Sverdlovsk "polytechnic" there was a military department, training on which allowed graduates to get the rank of reserve officer. The correspondence form of training in the UZPI did not provide such an opportunity. The presence of an officer's rank served as a guarantee from conscription for active military service as a soldier. However, in order to work at the Moscow institute, Kolevatov did not really need this title - the ministry of minesredmash could provide him with a respite from the draft (this norm was not generally accepted at the time, and besides, it was required to extend the deferral every year until the 27- old age). But the uniqueness of Kolevatov's life situation was that the call to real military services from Moscow was definitely profitable for him - he retained a place in the staff list of the enterprise and upon his return from the army he was restored no longer as a young specialist with a temporary residence permit in Moscow, but a permanent employee. With the provision of housing. That is, Alexander Kolevatov could turn into a 100% Muscovite and at the same time safely get an engineering diploma, graduating from the all-Union correspondence polytech.
However, this variant definitely did not suit him. One can not doubt that Alexander had a better life plan. And this plan definitely meant getting the rank of reserve officer.
Moscow Research Institute, in which Alexander Kolevatov worked as a senior laboratory assistant, was all permeated with KGB officers or with the agency of the Committee. The practice of seconding state security personnel to state institutions and industrial enterprises appeared in the late 1920s. last century, with the end of the NEP. In the staffing table of any more or less serious organization, there were posts intended to be replaced by either state security personnel or employees of the operating reserve (for us, the difference between them now does not matter). In this case, the whole institute was headed by a colonel of state security with more than 30 years of experience, one can say, a veteran of the Cheka. And in addition to explicit "gebists", at important defense enterprises, in scientific research institutes and institutions of strategic industries, there existed intelligence networks (so-called "lines"), similar to those described above. Only they were created and supervised by the counterintelligence unit of the same department (although, recall, from March 18, 1954, the secret-operational and counter-intelligence support were organisationally integrated into general divisions). There can be no doubt that Kolevatov was well known to curators from the service mode of the enterprise and moreover is known from the best side (according to the characteristic).
Kolevatov clearly wanted to make a career in the area in which he worked - that's why he entered the All-Union Correspondence Polytech. But then he received a more tempting proposal - young, healthy, sports Komsomol members were so needed by the State Security Committee! Alexander Kolevatov is an excellent sportsman, tourist, member of the Komsomol bureau of the division, leads a shooting section, has a third adult category in bullet shooting. Well, discharge, we will put, not the highest, but in Committee will learn ...! That, so we will measure the hardness of Vanadium alloys according to Rockwell and Brinel before old age or, perhaps, have a desire to do another, more responsible work? - something like that could ask Alexander on a sounding interview in the office of the deputy director for the regime. And Kolevatov did not refuse the proposal, because nobody would have refused it. Such a proposal was prestigious, it showed full confidence in the leadership and promised enchanting for the Urals guy life perspective.
Never would Kolevatov have moved from the All-Union Correspondence Department to the full-time department of the Sverdlovsk Polytech, if someone influential and very hidden did not ask for him. But Kolevatov transferred, which means that I was kindly requested. In this translation there is a very interesting nuance - it consists in the fact that the programs of different institutions are somewhat different. And although the first course in any technical university is always basic, designed to compensate for the flaws in schooling, even its programs in different technical universities differ. Not to mention the fact that even within the same course, the requirements of teachers m. are far from the same. In general, the transfer from the All-Union correspondence "polytechnic" to the full-time department of the Sverdlovsk UPI was not a matter of what was forbidden, but difficult to implement in practice. To Kolevatov, however, the translation was a success.
It is clear why Alexander translated into the UPI. First, he returned to his native land, which facilitated the household arrangement, and secondly, Sverdlovsk Polytech trained specialists to work at nuclear facilities in the Urals and Siberia. While studying at UPI, Kolevatov got an opportunity to get acquainted with many of his future colleagues in an informal atmosphere, which increased his value as a future counterintelligence officer.
There is another very interesting point, which should be noted. Alexander Kolevatov had a Finnish knife with a black handle and leather sheath. In principle, it was impossible to surprise anyone with such knives in those days, the camp craftsmen were sharpening similar products from saws and files, typing pencil-faced or textolite rings recognizable "dials". But Kolevatov had a Finnish knife registered at the police station, and a permit was issued for his wearing. For those times an unprecedented law-abiding! Especially if you take into account that every second student of the FZU in those years had a screwdriver in his pocket or a screwdriver, or an awl, or a file, and youth gangs controlled whole city districts with the onset of twilight. The explanation for this can be only one thing - Kolevatov did not want a single black spot in his biography, which could even be a banal drive to the police for the illegal storage of cold weapons with the registration of a relevant protocol. Such attention to the purity of the biography can only be demonstrated by a person who links with the formal irreproachability of the questionnaire a great life prospect. The drive to the police could not serve as a basis for expulsion from the institute or from the military department, in other words, this kind of problem could not interfere with Alesandra Kolevatov's engineering career. In prison, no one would imprison him, he did not deprive his freedom, well, he would have been "prosesci" at the Komsomol meeting, they reproved him, they reproached him (not even a reprimand) - that's all! In principle, nothing terrible. However, the only drive to the police could be enough to refuse to enroll in the KGB. If Alexander in 1957 really got into the staff reserve of the Committee and he was promised admission to the special services after the termination of the "Polytech", then he was then told to completely exclude any, even the most minor, violations of the law. Observing this demand, Alexander went to register his knife in the police station.
Summarizing all that has been said, I would like to note that we can not say with absolute certainty that Alexander was firmly associated with the Committee, but a high probability of such is seen from the unusual circumstances of his life.
Thus. in the dead group we see at least two people whose biographies make it possible to assume the existence of strong ties with the State Security Committee. This is Zolotarev, perfectly suitable for the role of the head of the agent network (resident) and Kolevatov, who could have been a member of this network since his transfer from Moscow to Sverdlovsk. In this connection, the question arises: what is the role of Georgy Krivonischenko and Rustem Slobodin in the operation of "controlled delivery" and did they even know about what was happening?
It seems that Krivonischenko played a very important role, even more important than Zolotarev and Kolevatov. Now that quite a lot of materials have been published on the skeletons of NATO-spies in the USSR, one can draw a fairly complete picture of how our opponents insured themselves against countering Soviet counterintelligence. Americans attached great importance to all kinds of unexpected checks of their agents and sources of information. So, for example, within three hours from the date of disembarkation, the agent was supposed to get in touch with a conditional signal informing about the successful landing. This requirement arose on the basis of intelligence experience: if the agent does not get in touch in the first hours, then he is not up to that - he either breaks away from the chase, or is already caught. In three hours the captured agent can not be re-turned, so he, being detained immediately upon landing, is likely to give the signal of "work under control." I must say that the Soviet MGB-KGB knew this reception (the communication session within three hours of the landing), therefore the paratroopers tried to detain not at the landing area, but at a considerable distance from it and, as a rule, several days later. This was done in order for the abandoned agent to send a signal to the intelligence center about the safe arrival and proceeded to fulfill the task.
There were many such tricks in the arsenal of NATO intelligence services, counting on many dozens. For example, sometimes during a communication session the agent was ordered to provide some details related to the things that he had. It could be the marking of a certain cartridge in the shop of his gun, or the number of links of a watch bracelet. The answer was given the minimum time, a few minutes, usually 5-10, not more. The logic of the inspectors was clear - the agent in the event of his arrest of the KGB would lose his weapons and hours, and therefore not be able to quickly give the correct answer. There is a case where, during a communication session, the agent was required to check the internal bonds in his possession and call the number of one of them - a 200-ruble bond with a torn right corner. The answer should be given within 10 minutes. The calculation on which this verification was based was also quite simple - upon the arrest of the agent, his money and bonds were withdrawn, and during the radio communication session he simply did not have them under his hand. By the way, in the case of the 200-ruble bond, the verification of its goal reached - the KGB officers handed over bonds to the finch and could not give the correct number to the agent working under their control (this happened in 1954 and since then in the special services of the USSR and Russia it was accepted in compulsory order all the seized money and securities to photograph.To the same they were on the list of numbers).
Knowing that inspections of agents are carried out by Americans constantly, the initiators of the "controlled delivery" from the KGB, of course, allowed the possibility that at a meeting in the taiga there would be a check. What kind of verification could have been, no one could say beforehand, but that's why she had to be especially apprehensive. If under the conditions of the operation "delivery" was supposed to occur from Chelyabinsk-40, then a person who knew the situation in this city became simply necessary. Neither Zolotarev nor Kolevatov was suitable for this role. Even if the Committee arranged for them a business trip to the site and the appropriate instruction, still a lot of nuances would remain "behind the scenes." The degree of awareness of the opposing party was unknown, and therefore one had to expect the most unexpected and insidious control questions, up to the name and patronymic of this or that leader or specification of technical details. American intelligence officers could quite easily inquire about the number of windows or floors in a building or an outsider, in which case it would be very difficult not to get into a slack. Krivonischenko, who worked in Chelyabinsk-40 for more than one year, was ready for such questions simply because of his production knowledge, and no hastily trained operative could pass a possible test better than him. Therefore, George, it seems, in this combination was simply necessary. One should also take into account his external correspondence to the required type of innocuous intellectual: with protruding ears, slender, only 169 cm tall, he seemed to be an innocuous boy who had just graduated from the institute, but not a "KGB bonesman" (which he was not essence). Well, besides that, Krivonischenko was a graduate of UPI, knew Igor Dyatlov well; It was much easier for him to get on a hike with the students of the Polytech, rather than the completely alien Semyon Zolotarev.
In general, in this puzzler-puzzle, George Krivonischenko seems to have his place. He had to transfer things with radioactive dust directly from hand to hand, with all the requirements that were imposed by the conditions of the operation. Zolotarev served as a leader, he was supposed to take pictures of people who came into contact with Krivonischenko and pronounced a pre-conditioned password for communication. Kolevatov acted as Zolotarev's assistant and, perhaps, served as a "spare player" in case of Krivonischenko's illness. The KGB, which for a long time was preparing a "controlled delivery", could not put the outcome of an important counter-intelligence operation in dependence on the health of a single person, so the possibility of replacing Krivonischenko by another person was clearly envisaged (although considered undesirable for the reasons described above).
In connection with the discussion of the personal composition of the possible participants in the "controlled delivery" operation, the question arises about the involvement of Rustem Slobodin. The latter, like Georgy Krivonischenko, was associated with atomic production in Chelyabinsk-40 and, in principle, could play the same role as George. However, nothing definite about this can not be said. The confidence that Krivonischenko is somehow connected with radioactive things is based on the fact that his corpse was found undressed (without winter pants and sweaters) and the things taken from the deceased used for their warmth Thibault Brinol and Dubinin (concepts that did not have about their high radioactive contamination). And Rustem Slobodin's connection with radioactive clothing is not traceable in any form. The study of photographs taken by him on a march does not give reason to suspect that Rustem was in a state of intense expectation or discomfort (a separate section entitled "A Journey Through the Eyes of Its Participants" is devoted to the analysis of marching photographs, so we will not go into this topic now). In the biography of Rustem Slobodin, there are no alarming moments, forcing to assume the presence of strong contacts with the KGB. In any case, at this stage, we can state only this ...